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2.1  Introduction 
The international financial community has often preferred to repeat 
the past rather than study it. Since 1974 international lending has passed 
through another cycle of  enthusiasm followed by  nonrepayment and 
creditor revulsion, repeating a pattern that has recurred several times 
since the eighteenth century. 
The process is costly. Relative to ordinary private lending, lending 
to sovereign debtors' brings costs to either side or both sides, and often 
to third parties. The unenforceability of debt service obligations sooner 
or later breeds lasting creditor distrust and cuts the supply of  capital 
to countries where its marginal product is generally high. One such net 
capital cost takes the form of  credit disruptions and other penalties 
levied by  creditors, with greater damage to the debtors than gain to 
the creditors. The debtors'  macroeconomies are destabilized  by  the 
borrowing boom and later bust, especially when the bust brings un- 
foreseen austerity. 
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Those caught in the current lingering debt crisis cannot blame their 
innocence on  an absence of  historical  literature. The recurrence of 
default has been pointed out by scholars and by bondholder protective 
councils for a century (Fenn 1874-98;  Corporation of Foreign  Bond- 
holders, annually from 1873; Clarke  1879; Fitch 1918; Foreign  Bond- 
holders’ Protective Council, annually from 193.5; Kimber 1925 and 1933; 
Winkler 1933; Borchard 1951; Mintz 1951; Wynne 1951; Cameron 1961, 
chaps. 13- 16; Bittermann  1973; Kindleberger  1978; Cizauskas 1979). 
Scholars have added a comparative anatomy of debt crisis, finding what 
kinds of trends trigger debt crises and what kinds of borrowers are less 
likely  to repay (Diaz-Alejandro  1984, Edwards  1984, Fishlow  198.5, 
Sachs 1985, Eichengreen and Portes 1986). We  know that the problem 
inheres in  sovereign debt, that the timing of  the crises is  related  to 
unforeseen deflation, and that countries with runaway government bud- 
gets and less commitment to trade are more likely to have recurring 
repayment crises. 
The remaining uncertainties are how the lending waves unfold and 
what  can  be done once a  crisis  is  in  full  swing.  This chapter ad- 
dresses these two issues at the start and end of  the lending  cycle. 
In section 2.2, we shall argue that past lending to foreign governments 
has  brought  high  private  returns in  the aggregate,  but  with  curious 
patterns that suggest (but cannot prove) an unprofitable  “bubble”  dy- 
namic of excessive investment followed by excessive revulsion. Inves- 
tors seem to pay little attention to the past repayment record of the 
borrowing governments. They may or may not have been wise in ig- 
noring the past. Their inattention, at any rate, reveals that they do not 
punish governments with a prior default history, undercutting the belief 
in a penalty that compels faithful repayment. 
Section 2.3 turns to historical experience with the different policy 
options available in the wake of a major debt crisis. Noting the nec- 
essary imperfections  in any policy approach, we discuss some argu- 
ments in  favor  of  the  older  bond-era direct confrontation between 
problem debtors and their creditors, an approach that usually  led to 
partial default. The more recent approach of bringing the IMF and the 
World Bank into tripartite debt-crisis negotiations  has brought  extra 
costs relating to moral hazard, delays, and macroeconomic adjustment. 
It is fair to ask whether history should be consulted at all as a guide 
to present debt-crisis options. As a statistician might put it: “If history 
is supposed to be the sample, what is the population?  And are we really 
sampling from the same population today as in the past?” That is, is 
there really a probability distribution of outcomes likely to be shared 
by  the  past  and the present? A  cautious affirmative  answer can be 
ventured in this particular case. The merits of comparison and contrast 
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Such is the case with sovereign debt, which is subject to that inherent 
defect of unenforceability and which reveals its basic repayment and 
relending  dynamic only  over a  long  period  of  time.  In  such cases, 
deductive modeling quickly reaches barriers that only a longer empir- 
ical view can push back. 
2.2  Sovereign Debt Repayment since the Early 19th Century 
It has been suggested that it would be far better were the national 
capital  employed in  home  works instead  of  being  lent  to foreign 
countries. So far as an individual  is concerned, whether he loses 
f1,OOO in a [domestic] bubble company or  in a swindling foreign loan, 
the operation and the sequel are the same. (Hyde Clarke  1879, 21.) 
If there were no rescuer, no International  Monetary Fund, how would 
sovereign debt work? How well would creditors and debtors be likely 
to fare? How far below the ex ante contracted rates of return were the 
rates eventually realized by the whole chain of debtholders? Were the 
returns either so excessive or so low that they suggest a case for special 
policy intervention in defense of either debtors or creditors? While the 
future need not match past patterns, there is a long and varied history 
to tap in forming guesses. In what follows, we offer an extensive menu 
of results, allowing readers to choose which results to emphasize. 
2.2.1  Background 
Fresh lending to foreign governments followed the same wave-like 
pattern as other international lending in the nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth  centuries. There was a post-Napoleonic  wave  in the  1820s, in- 
cluding loans to most of the newly independent nations of Latin America, 
followed by  widespread  default.  Gross lending  to governments, like 
international lending in general, returned to high tide in the 1850s, in 
the late 1860s and early 1870s, in the late 1880s, in 1904- 14, and again 
in the late  1920s. The wave of lending to foreign governments in the 
late 1920s, like that of  1974-82,  exceeded any before World War I  in 
real absolute value and even as a share of lender-country GNP. Each 
wave ended with at least some occurrence of repayments breakdown, 
sometimes due to international  trade depression, sometimes due to 
government budget  crises, and  sometimes due to the revelation  of 
financial abuses.2 
The timing and magnitude of the lending waves is illuminated differ- 
ently by figure 2.1. We cast a particular light on the long-noted waves by 
measuring the net real investment  flow, rather than the  gross  flow. Setting 
aside the “spike” of 1894, caused by heavy Russian borrowing (not all of 
it truly external),  figure 2.1 singles out the 1906- 14 and 1973-81 waves as 
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were divided by real national product or real wealth. The famous wave 
of the 1920s is less impressive on this net investment measure. It was, 
to a large extent, a refinancing wave in which fresh loans, most of them 
in dollars, largely covered service on prewar, mostly sterling, loans. It 
was also, of course, an era in which international lending was partly 
preoccupied with trying to induce German recovery and reparations. 
Who defaulted, and when? It is not easy to summarize the frequency 
or percentage of nonrepayment. We  begin by noting the countries that 
Fig. 2.1  Real net investment by foreign creditors in the government 
debt of ten countries, annually, 1850-1982.  Notes: The ver- 
tical  axis measures the real  value of  fresh lending to ten 
governments-Argentina,  Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey-by  foreign cred- 
itors, predominantly private, minus retirements on the same 
external debt in the same year. The figures are in millions of 
dollars at 1913 prices,  with flows in other currencies con- 
verted at the 1913 exchange rates. Payments of interest are 
not included, nor are changes in the real value of outstanding 
debt due to movements in the consumer-price deflator. 
The large “spike”  of  1894 was a loan package of  $1,489.5 
million to the Russian government, much of which may have 
been purchased by Russian creditors. On the foreign-domestic 
mixture in subscriptions to Russian hard-currency loans see 
Anan’ich and Bovykin (forthcoming, section 2). 
The genuine rise after 1973 is slightly exaggerated in relative 
terms by a change in  series.  For developing countries the 
post-1970 data cover not only bonds but the other types of 
lending  captured in  the World  Bank’s  loan disbursements 
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defaulted outright, in whole or in part, at one time or another, here 
and in table 2.8 in appendix B. 
Soon after the lending wave of the 1820s most Latin American gov- 
ernments defaulted  to some degree. Several southern states in  the 
United States defaulted in the 1830s-40s  and again in the Reconstruc- 
tion era. Latin America and the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Tur- 
key and, momentarily, Egypt) figured prominently in the default waves 
of the mid-nineteenth  century. The end of the late-1880s  lending wave 
featured relatively few defaults, the most notable  being Argentina’s 
partial nonrepayment (on which more later) and lingering difficulties 
with Colombia’s debt service. Brazil’s good record was finally com- 
promised with repayment lapses necessitating refunding loans in  1898 
and 1914. The 1910s brought wholesale defaults in the Mexican Rev- 
olution, the Russian Revolution, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
The greatest wave, however, came in the early 1930s (Eichengreen and 
Portes 1986; Eichengreen, chap. 3 of this volume), in which essentially 
all of Latin America, most of Eastern Europe, Turkey, and China de- 
faulted. In the early postwar years, with  bond finance  dried up and 
most of the trickle of loans coming from governments or with  their 
guarantees, outright default was replaced with a murmur of repeated 
concessionary refundings for problem governments, notably Turkey, 
Latin America, and some newly independent nations (Bittermann, 1973). 
The list of countries needing concessionary refundings in the 1970s and 
1980s is more extensive but similar, still featuring Latin America, East- 
ern Europe, and now much of Africa (Watson et al. 1986). 
Other areas always repaid. One was Western Europe outside of Ger- 
many and Spain. Another consisted of the sovereign Arab nations, with 
only slight exceptions. Asia east of the Persian Gulf consistently repaid, 
except for China in the 1930s, Japan between 1941 and 1952, and the 
independent Philippines. So did the white Commonwealth nations. 
The list of incomplete repayers by itself conveys only very limited 
information, however. Foreign governments had to offer higher interest 
rates than creditors’ home governments, precisely because nonrepay- 
ment was feared. To  judge their repayment behavior or to judge the 
lenders’ behavior, one needs a careful accounting of  their borrowings 
and debt-service outflows. 
To  capture the overall tendency in sovereign debt repayment, one 
needs to examine as long a period as possible, in order to avoid overem- 
phasis on either good or bad times. One must also take care to sample 
loans or countries fairly, to avoid picking a sample of particularly prob- 
lematic  borrowers or particularly  faithful  ones. The desired  goal  is 
equiprobable sampling of all constant-price dollars ever lent by private 
parties to foreign governments that were expected to remain sovereign, 
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of constant dollars. In practice, one samples in some more convenient 
way that does not sacrifice representativeness to any serious degree. 
Eichengreen and Portes (1986) drew a random sample of loans from 
the 1920s, giving equal sampling chance to each loan, not far from equal 
sampling of each constant dollar. We  intend different coverage here, 
encompassing only loans to governments but spanning a much longer 
period  of time. The longer time  span means a diversity of  sources, 
preventing our sampling individual loans from all times and nations. 
To  span as long a time period as was practical,  we began with the 
bonds outstanding in  1850, and those floated between 1850 and about 
1970, following them all the way to settlement or to the end of  1983. 
In choosing bonds to follow, we exploited the historical concentration 
of sovereign debt into a small number of borrowing governments. Spe- 
cifically,  we follow  the experiences of  ten  borrowing  governments: 
Argentina,  Australia, Brazil,  Canada, Chile,  Egypt, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey. We  follow their foreign  bond  debt, drawing on 
bondholder annuals, periodic compendia of foreign investments (Fenn, 
Fitch, Kimber,  Dominick  and  Dominick,  etc.), and country studies. 
We  concentrate on bond lending, with separate later treatment of the 
brief bank-loan wave of  1974-82. 
Table 2.1 ranks the top external-debtor governments by their debts 
on three benchmark dates. As can be seen, our ten-country sample 
accounted for a large share on each date. Our ten were almost, but not 
quite,  the  top  ten  borrowers  over  the  last  130-odd  years.  As 
appendix A elaborates, we included Chile, a more interesting but less 
important borrower, in lieu of New Zealand or South Africa. The use 
of Chile may slightly bias the ten-country sample toward a low-repay- 
ment  result  from a worldwide  perspective, but  the conclusions that 
follow take this possible bias into account. 
The procedures used to process 1,552 external bonds from the history 
of the ten countries are laborious and complex. One has to  judge which 
debtors were truly “sovereign” in the sense of being able to evade the 
usual legal recourses faced by ordinary private defaulters. Though one 
could  extend the term to cover anybody borrowing  from  a foreign 
source, we have followed only government borrowers, including local 
governments but excluding private borrowers backed by government 
guarantee. One must also judge which government debts were truly 
external. Our judgments rested on the place of issue, the currency of 
account, and hints about the residence of most holders. Appendix A 
offers a guide to our treatment of such complexities. 
2.2.2  Choosing Summary Measures 
Summarizing the flows of real resources between creditors and debt- 
ors calls for three related measures. One is the internal rate of return 
on the loans. with all flows converted into real consumable resources. 45  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
The resources in question are consumables of the lending countries, 
since (a) these mattered directly to lenders, (b) the loans were in lending- 
country currency, and  (c) appropriate price  deflators  are harder to 
derive for the debtor countries. 
The second measure is the real rate of return on an alternative asset, 
used for comparison with the real (and realized) internal rate on foreign 
sovereign debt. Any choice of an alternative asset implies a degree of 
riskiness, which may or  may not be comparable with the risk on lending 
to a foreign government. The main  quantitative results  all compare 
sovereign foreign debt with home-country bonds. For foreign debt re- 
payable in sterling, the home-country alternative was to buy consols. 
For foreign debt repayable in dollars, the home-country alternative was 
long-term U.S.  government bondsO3  We follow an unconventional pro- 
cedure, however, in specifying the term structure of the investment in 
the alternative asset, as explained more fully in appendix A. To min- 
imize the influence of  inflation  and deflation on the difference in the 
real ex post rates of return on foreign sovereign debt and home-country 
debt, we match the stream of repayments on the hypothetical holdings 
of home-country debt to the actual repayments on the foreign sovereign 
debt in question. The alternative real rate of return is thus an average 
of real  ex post rates on a mixture of holdings of home-country gov- 
ernmental bonds maturing at the times dictated by the actual repay- 
ments of foreign sovereign debt. 
The third  summary measure is a net present value of the foreign 
sovereign debt vis-a-vis home country debt. Specifically, it is the pres- 
ent value  of  the repayments on the mixture  of  home-country bond 
holdings, discounted back to the time of purchase, minus the amount 
actually lent to a foreign government with the same realized repayment 
stream. It is thus the amount by which lenders to foreign governments 
were able to lend less to foreign governments than they would have 
had to lend to the home government to get the same repayments (again, 
see appendix A for details). 
How should we deal with the fact that the loans occurred at different 
times? How should a loan made in 1850 be weighed against a loan made 
in  1950? The answer depends on the question being asked. One might 
wish to know how much better or worse the whole chain of investors 
would  have fared ex post  if  they  had  chosen the alternative asset, 
instead of the sovereign foreign debt, starting from a moment in history. 
To find out, one would use the first kind of procedure: 
1. All investments are discounted to the same year (e.g., 1850), at 
This first procedure will give heavy weight to early experience (e.g., 
loans in 1850), regardless of the date to which all flows are discounted. 
A more important question, however, is what probability distribution 
the alternative-asset interest rate (p). Table 2.1  Top Governments Ranked by Gross External Debt to Private Creditors,  1913-14,1930, 
and 1979 
1913-14  End of  1930  End of 1979 
Rank  Country  %  Country  %  Country  % 
%p  I0 externully-indebted governments ut each date 
Russia  35.7  Australia 
Australia  9.0  Canada 
Japan  6.7  Brazil 
Brazil  5.8  Japan 
Argentina  5.1  Union of South Africa 
Turkey  4.8  New Zealand 
Union of South Africa  4.3"  Rumania 
Mexico  3.5  Belgium 
Canada  3.4  Argentina 
Egypt  3.4  Chile 
Orher sample countries 
(15) Chile  1.4  (12) Egypt 
Mexico, in default" 
Russia, in default" 
Turkey, in defaultb 
All countries  100.0  All countries 
Share owed by  10 sample  78.8 
Total value ($ billion):  12.6 
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108 Sources; For 1913-14,  we preferred Kimber (1925) and our detailed estimates for the ten sample countries, but 
made sparing use of United Nations (1948). For 1930, we preferred Royal Institute for International Affairs (1937) 
and our detailed estimates, but also made use of United  Nations (1948). For 1979, we used Moody’s Munual of 
municipals  und governments for bonds issued by governments of developed countries, and the World  Bank’s 
World debt tables for gross disbursed borrowings (not just bonds) of  developing-country governments from private 
foreign creditors. The difference in coverage may elevate the ranks of  less developed countries. 
“Total public debt, not just external 
bThe outstanding amounts on Mexican, Russian and Turkish external loans are disregarded here as they were 
effectively repudiated, in order to give balances that were more representative of borrowing activity in the 1920s 
(for 1930) and the 1970s (for 1979). 
Excluded from this table are foreign borrowings of financial-center countries, which debts were not “external” 
in the sense that a strictly external repudiation was made more difficult by their ready salability in the borrowing 
country. In the absence of comprehensive exchange controls, any repudiation would have to apply to all public 
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of outcomes the past suggests for future experience. Here the reader 
has free range of choice. Is the more peaceful experience of the mid- 
nineteenth century the best lesson that the past has to offer the future? 
If  so, one could be content with the first procedure. But if  one (plau- 
sibly) considers more recent experience more relevant, one can choose 
from these three workable procedures: 
2. “all loans at once’’-give  the same weight to every constant-price 
dollar of fresh lending, regardless  of  when it occurred, starting 
all loans at the same hypothetical year. This gives somewhat greater 
weight to the heavy gross flows of the 1920s than to the smaller 
gross volume of prewar lending; 
3. do the same as in (2),  but weight each loan by its share of lending- 
country wealth  at the time  of  the loan  instead  of  deflating  by 
consumer prices; or 
4.  insist that only the interwar and postwar experience is a valuable 
guide to the future. 
We consider the second-“all  loans at once”-the  fairest offering from 
the pre-1973 past to the future, but our results can also be used to infer 
the results of procedure (4). 
The available  data allow us to compare realized  flows with  those 
originally contracted, and to compare nominal flows with real (price- 
deflated) ones. Three of the following four kinds of flows, with their 
corresponding rates of return, are presented: 
Contracted (ex unte)  Realized (ex  post) 
Nominal  Table 2.2  Table 2.10 
Real  Not calculated  Table 2.3 
Table 2.2 sets the stage by introducing national average ex ante re- 
turns and capitalized values contracted at the time of bond issue. In 
the bond era, investors asked for premia (u -  p) on foreign government 
bonds that were usually  between  1.5 and 2.6 percent. These premia 
will  serve as a yardstick  for several comparisons to follow. We  will 
find, first, that the real realized returns were well below these ex ante 
premia. Virtually all of the shortfall in real realized returns was due 
to defaults, not to ex post inflation, which  affected both  home-bond 
and  foreign-bond  returns  similarly.  Second,  the  ex  ante  rates  in 
table 2.2 did not  differ across countries in any way that consistently 
foretold the international differences in ex post returns. True, the mar- 
ket guessed  “right”  in  charging lower premia  to Canada and  Japan 
before World War 11, and in charging more to prerevolutionary Mexico 
and T~rkey.~  But the market was unable to foresee the enforced full 
repayment by Egypt or the massive default by czarist Russia. The wide 
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Table 2.2  Contracted Nominal Returns on Bond Lending to Ten Foreign 
Governments,  1850-1983 
Rates of Return (%)  (Millions of $)  Risk-Neutral 
Borrowing  Expected % of 
Nation  n  V  i;  V-5  NPV  Lo  Capital Loss 
A. All marketed bonds, 1850-1983 
Argentina  181  5.92  3.47  2.45 
Brazil  129  6.19  3.64  2.55 
Chile  60  6.89  3.94  2.95 
48  5.83  3.11  2.72  Mexico 
Four Latins  418  6.09  3.52  2.57 
Australia  439  5.60  4.52  I .09 
Canada  488  4.51  2.82  1.69 
Egypt  20  6.71  3.29  3.43 
Japan  60  5.75  3.51  2.24 
Russia  48  4.94  2.92  2.01 
46  5.86  3.33  2.53  Turkey 
These six  1,101  5.44  3.86  1.59 
All ten  1,519  5.59  3.78  1.81 
B.  Bonds issued 1850-1914  (or outstanding in 1850) 
--- 
--- 
Argentina  110  5.07  2.91 
Brazil  77  4.86  2.95 
Chile  32  5.39  2.98 
33  5.78  2.91 
Four Latins  252  5.19  2.93 









232  4.35  3.01 
62  4.47  3.17 
17  7.18  3.11 
32  4.36  2.90 
48  4.94  2.92 
34  7.39  3.16 
425  5.13  2.98 
677  5.32  2.97 
--- 
C.  Bonds issued  1915-1945 
Argentina  69  5.81  3.78 
Brazil  52  7.85  4.51 
Chile  28  7.86  4.56 
Four Latins  149  6.76  4.13 










114  5.16  4.00 
243  4.51  3.94 
3  3.75  4.40 
9  7.71  4.48 
00  0 
372  - 35  4.05 
-  34.303.30 
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Table 2.2  (continued) 
Rates of Return (96)  (~illi~~~  of $)  Risk-Neutral 
Borrowing  Expected 9%  of 
Nation  n  V  p  V-p  NPV  Lo  Capital Loss 
D.  Bonds issued ciffer  194.V 
Argentina  4  8.88 
Brazil  00 
Chile  00 
Mexico  15  5.94 
Four Latins  19  7.53 
-- 
Australia  93 
Canada  183 
EgyptC  0 
Japan  19 
Russia  0 
9 
These six  304 
All  ten  323 










3.95  4.93 
0  0 
0  0 
-  3.56  2.39 
3.77  3.76 
5.37  0.95 
2.28  2.23 
0  0 
3.70  2.91 
0  0 
3.58 
4.68  1.17 











































n = the number of bonds covered here. 
u  = the internal rate of return implied by the bond issue price and repayment terms. 
6  = the rate of interest on bond  lending to the home government (U.K. consol rate or U.S. 
Treasury long-term bond rate, depending on the place of issue). 
NPV  =  net present value, defined in  the following special way: the amount investors were 
able to save by  buying the same promised repayment stream from a foreign government at 
higher interest instead of from the British or U.S. government. 
Lo = the gross value initially lent to the foreign government. 
The “risk-neutral’’ expected % of capital loss”  = (v -  p)/(I + V)  is a suggestive hypothetical 
measure used  here as in  Feder and Just  (1984). If  bond  purchasers were  risk-neutral, the 
coexistence of the two rates of return, v and p. would imply the stated percentage of  expected 
nonrepayment on the higher-yielding foreign  bonds. To the extent that purchasers are risk- 
averse, (v -  G)/(l  +  v)  overstates their expectation of capital losses and instead reflects their 
aversion to the asset with the higher contracted yield. 
uTwo  unsuccessful conversion loans to Mexico in  1943 (valued at f293,000) have been included 
in the 1850-1914  sample, to make them part of the aggregate prerevolutionary experience here 
as in table 2.3.  Including them causes a very slight understatement of the ex ante contracted 
returns on prerevolutionary bonds. 
hT~o  dollar loans to the Czarist government in  1916 have been included  in  the prewar totals. 
CThe  three interwar Egyptian bonds are actually Ottoman debt settlements loans, not true market 
loans. 
sample excluded bonds issued in the 1970s and 198Os, except for those issued by Australia 
and Canada. We sought to follow all external bond issues up to about 1970. The  general inactivity 
of the postwar bond market meant that our bond populations stopped with bonds issued in the 
following final years: Argentina, 1968; Australia, 1978; Brazil and Chile, 1930; Canada, 1982; 
Egypt, Japan, and Turkey, 1965; Mexico,  1966; and Russia,  1916. All  subsequent flows were 
followed through 1983, after which the remaining small balances were assumed to be paid off. 
‘The  1965 Egyptian bond issued in Kuwait has been excluded for want of sufficient information. 
The 488 Canadian bonds have been handled differently from others. To save time developing 
computer routines for these well-behaved bonds, we aggregated their payment flows on separate 
spreadsheets, one for each province or the Dominion and each of  the two currency categories 51  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
Table 2.2  (continued) 
(US-dollar and non-dollar). Each Canadian “loan” entered into the ten-country data processing 
is therefore a set of aggregate payments streams resulting from many loans issued and maturing 
at different times. For the period breakdown of parts B, C,  and D of this table, the accumulated 
Canadian balances were assumed to be paid off at the ends of 1914, 1945, and 1983. The  different 
treatment of Canada causes understatement of  the value of Canadian loans relative to those 
issued by other countries, but should not affect the rates of return greatly. 
The total  numbers of loans are often below those of table  2.3 below,  because table  2.2 is 
supposed to focus only on bonds accepted by the marketplace, not conversion loans forced on 
dissatisfied holders of problem debt. 
Reminder: nominal values from periods of very different commodity price levels have been 
aggregated together. This otherwise inappropriate aggregation facilitates comparison with the 
more relevant real-value aggregations in table 2.3 below. 
Real realized returns are summarized in Table 2.3, first for all bonds, 
then for the largely-sterling prewar bonds, then for the largely-dollar 
interwar bonds, and finally for a few postwar bonds, with  values  in 
sterling at 1913 prices converted into 1913-price dollars at $4.86. The 
results in table 2.3 are best understood by surveying  individual-country 
results first, before discussing possible inferences about the efficiency 
of the overall sovereign-debt portfolio. 
2.2.3  Repayment Experience for Individual Borrowing 
Governments in the Bond Era 
The credit histories summarized in table 2.3 cover the whole spec- 
trum from perfectly  faithful  repayers to governments that have  de- 
faulted massively enough to give their foreign creditors negative rates 
of  return. Let us scan the spectrum, from  the best repayers to the 
worst. 
Some governments have repaid all their foreign bond debts faithfully 
since the mid-nineteenth  century. One in particular ended up having 
no choice in the matter. By 1879 Egypt had been teetering on the brink 
of default for several years. On 22 April that year the Khedive Ismail, 
in a final defiance of his European creditors, issued a decree amounting 
to a unilateral partial default on outstanding bonds. In response the 
British and French governments pressured the Ottoman sultan to de- 
pose Ismail  and  replace  him  with  Tewfik,  his  more compliant  son. 
British and French officials took over control of Egyptian government 
revenue, managing it in the interests of the private creditors (Wynne 
1951,598-61 1;  Landes 1958, 302-18;  Feder and Just 1984). Egypt lost 
national sovereignty, which was not regained until after World War 11. 
It cost her dearly. Egypt fully repaid at a high interest rate reflecting 
her ex ante ability to default. She obtained  a few more loans before 
World War I, but none thereafter until midcentury. Table 2.3 shows the 
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on prewar bonds, well above the 3.49 percent realized on the alternative 
streams of consol loans. The combination of ex ante sovereignty and 
ex post nonsovereignty brought Egypt's private creditors an extra 2.92 
percent per ann~m.~ 
Three other governments were faithful  repayers, at less cost than 
Egypt bore because the market trusted them a bit more from the start. 
Australia, Canada, and Japan have faithfully serviced their sterling and 
U.S. dollar bonds, with the exception of Japan's nonpayment of  any 
debt service between Pearl Harbor and the end of the occupation in 
1952. Perhaps in exchange, Australia and Canada were also heavy gross 
borrowers, able to return to the market repeatedly since 1850. Each 
of these governments had  slight limitations on its sovereignty before 
World War I, though none to the degree of Egypt's subjugation under 
Table 2.3  Realized Real Returns on Bond Lending to Ten Foreign 
Governments,  1850-1983 
Rates of  Return (%)  6  mill. at 1913 prices) 
Borrowing 
Nation  n  v  P  v-p  NPV  LO  - 
A.  All marketed bonds and conversion bonds, 1850-1983 
Argentina  187  3.52  1.56  I .96 
Brazil  143  2.97  2.14  0.83 
Chile  60  1.66  1.88  -0.22 
Mexico  52-0.21  -  1.72  -1.92 
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2.40  2.14 





-  1.63 
-  1.29 
0.26 
0.42 
B.  Bonds issued, 1850-1914  (or outstanding in  1850) 
Argentina  1 I3  3.52  1.81  1.71 
Brazil  79  2.27  1.38  0.89 
Chile  32  2.79  1.31  1.48 
37  -0.74  -  1.98  -2.72  Mexico" 
Four Latins  26 1  2.21  1.65  0.57 
Australia  232  3.02  2.01  1.01 
Canada  62  4.77  3.50  1.27 
Egypt  18  6.41  3.49  2.92 
Japan  32  I .85  0.60  I .25 
-- 
Russiab  48  1.31  2.94  -  1.63 
1.61  -  3.17 -  -1.56  -  42  -  Turkey 
These six  434  2.09  2.48  -0.39 
All ten  695  2.12  2.26  -0.14' 
405.9 
156.5 
-  3.9 
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Table 2.3  (continued) 
Rates of Return (76)  ($ mill. at 1913 prices) 
Borrowing 
Nation  n  W  P  u-p  NPV  LO 
- 
C.  Bonds issued 1915-1945 
Argentina  70  3.34  I .39  1.95  135.3  928.0 
Brazil  64  4.31  3.61  0.70  32.9  436.7 
Chile  28  0.54  2.44  -  1.90  -58.9  251.6 
Mexico  -  0-  0  0  0  0  0  -- 
Four Latins  162  3.17  2.15  1.01  109.3  1,616.3 
Australia  1 I4  4.18  2.97  1.21  279.3  2,165.1 
Canada  243  3.41  2.76  0.65  93.9  379.  I 
Egyptd  3  4.41  5.41  -0.73  -2.9  40.9 
Japan  9  5.89  3.62  2.26  83.2  340.2 
Russia  0  0  0  0  0  0 
3  -3.16  -2.27  -0.88  -3.4  47.2 
These six  372  4.16  2.97  1.20  450.2  2,972.5 
----  Turkeye 
All ten  534  3.81  2.68  1.13  559.5  4,588.8 
D.  Bonds issued after 1945 
Argentina  4  5.51  0.81  4.70  19.0  87.3 
Brazil  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Chile  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Mexico  2.67  -  0.35  2.31  -  17.2  89.1 
Four Latins  19  4.08  0.58  3.50  36.2  176.4 
Australia  93  0.81  0.09  0.72  71.1  1,183.3 
Canada  183  0.47  -1.78  2.25  378.5  524.3 
Egypt  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Japan  19  2.32  0.06  2.25  16.8  91.4 
Russia  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1.21  1.55  -0.34  -3.7  176.5  Turkey 
These six  304  0.83  -0.28  1.10  462.6  1,975.5 
All ten  323  1.09  -0.21  1.30  498.8  2,151.9 
Nores: The algebraic symbols are defined as in table 2.2, except that real rates replace 
nominal.  The rates of return  w and p  now contain subtractions for the ex post rate of 
consumer-price inflation in the lending country, and every flow is deflated by a lending- 
country consumer price index. 
“As in table 2.2, two unsuccessful Mexican conversion loans from the 1915-45  period 
have been shifted to the pre-1914 period. 
bTwo dollar loans to czarist Russia in  1916 have been shifted to the pre-1914 period. 
CThe aggregate rate spread (v - 6)  for the ten countries is negative, despite a positive 
NPV, because it  is  artificially calculated as an Lo-weighted average from the rates for 
the ten countries. If the rates of  return had been properly derived from a computer run 
specific to the ten-country total, (w -  p)  would have been positive. 
dThree loans unsuccessfully  aimed at settling Egypt’s Ottoman debt. 
eThree bonds issued by Turkey in  1933-35,  just before commodity prices rebounded 
from their trough. Hence the negative p. 
The present figures are based on a larger set of  bonds than in table 2.2. Conversion 
bonds, aimed at reviving payments on previous problem bonds, are now included. In 
some cases these were attached to the records of the previous problem bonds, while in 
other cases they were entered as separate bonds, possibly in a later period. 
-  -  15  - 
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the British occupation. The imperial and Commonwealth tie presum- 
ably restrained Australian  and Canadian  temptation to avoid  repay- 
ment. Japan feared heavy borrowing, especially early in the Meiji reign, 
and repaid faithfully until 1941 out of fears that arrears would be used 
as a pretext for foreign intervention. 
Argentina also compensated foreign creditors for the tangible risk of 
her default. The federal government did refuse full repayment in the 
1820s and again in the early 1890s, and provincial and municipal gov- 
ernments defaulted  in  the  1930s. Yet  the defaults  of  the nineteenth 
century were never complete, and the federal government retired all 
its  debt on time  through  the  1930s and  1940s. On  balance, foreign 
bondholders got an average real interest premium of 1.96 percent per 
annum on all Argentine bonds since 1850. 
Brazil’s record was mixed, though positive on balance. She repaid 
her sterling (and franc) debts very faithfully, most of them being retired 
before the crisis of the  1930s. Her dollar debt, however,  was largely 
repudiated in that crisis. Brazil unilaterally offered partial repayments 
later, leaving an ex post interest premium of 0.83 percent as bond-era 
legacy. 
Chile is the marginal case. Until  1930 she was a perfect repayer, at 
an elevated interest rate. But her default in the 1930s was so complete, 
with so little offered creditors out of later nitrate revenues, that her 
overall repayment only about matched what lenders would  have re- 
ceived by lending to their home governments. 
Turkey, by  contrast, declined repayment on two major occasions, 
the default of  1876-81  and the refusal of the Nationalist government 
to repay Ottoman debts after World War I and Versailles. The former 
episode well  illustrates  what Fishlow  has called  “revenue default” 
(Fishlow 1985; Wynne 1951, 393-453).  Turkey’s default was virtually 
assured by  a pattern of overspending, corruption and inefficiency of 
tax collection dating back at least to the Crimean war loan of  1854. 
Turkey’s creditors received only some of the generous interest rates 
initially offered them, with the result that the whole package of Turkish 
bonds has yielded a lower present value than the corresponding amounts 
of less risky consols, as shown in table 2.3. 
The net gain from lending to Mexico was clearly negative. Table 2.3 
shows, in fact, that even the gross realized internal rate of return was 
negative  in  the case of Mexican  bonds since 1850, ignoring the net 
default on bonds before our 1850 starting point. 
Mexican  experience pitted  the default incentive  against gunboats, 
with default the ultimate victor, after an interlude of financial health. 
Throughout her first half-century of independence, a series of Mexican 
governments borrowed desperately and defaulted regularly. The crisis 
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Spain intervened in an attempt to seize control of the customs collec- 
tions previously  promised to private creditors. In the shuffle France 
installed Maximilian, who floated new loans, part of  which financed 
partial repayments on old debt.6  After Maximilian fell, the government 
of  Benito Juarez refused  to  repay  debts or honor  customs-revenue 
pledges, from Maximilian or earlier. Later, in  1885-86,  favorable ne- 
gotiations with Porfirio Diaz ushered in a whole generation of financial 
rehabilitation  and renewed  foreign borrowing, to be  stopped by  the 
revolution in 191 1. Thereafter, the old pattern returned: tentative debt 
agreements, each promptly breached (Lill 1919; Turlington 1930; Wynne 
1951, 3-108;  Bazant  1968). Thus ended Mexico’s bond era, her credit 
not restored until the famous 1974-82  wave of bank lending. 
The most negative experience was that tied to the government that 
borrowed from foreigners the most before World War I. By some out- 
ward indicators, czarist Russia might have seemed creditworthy. The 
imperial government had repaid loans faithfully, even to the extent of 
paying out more in debt service than it received in fresh loans between 
1900 and  1913. Her trade  and production  were  also growing apace 
(Fishlow 1985, table 3). Not far under the surface, however, the Russian 
government bonds were used in ways that did not promise repayment 
to the bondholders, revolution or no revolution. The investors, partic- 
ularly those in France, were the ones who lost sovereignty in this case, 
deceived by the French and Russian governments in concert. Russia 
was building railways, to be sure, but at least from 1888 on the routes 
were being chosen for military purposes in consultation with the French 
government and French armaments suppliers (Feis 1930, 218-23).  The 
main form of  repayment was thus the political-military benefit reaped 
by the Allied governments, as Hawtrey has stressed: 
[Tlhe investor . . . was induced to hand over his money directly to 
pay for an allied country by  way of  preparation. The investor lost 
his money, because when the war came, the ally could not stand the 
strain. The strategic railways were not finished, the munitions were 
inadequate,  the  government was  inefficient and corrupt.  Still the 
investment was not wholly fruitless. Russia, at any rate, kept seventy 
divisions occupied for three years (as cited in Feis 1930, 220-24). 
Other parts  of  the  loan  proceeds were also used  by  the imperial 
government to manipulate the lending governments and the investors. 
The French  financial press was bribed  by  the  czar’s agents to give 
glowing descriptions of Russia’s financial prospects on the eve of new 
bond flotations (Raffalovich  193 1). Russian  officials also maneuvred 
their large deposits among foreign banks so as to embarrass any bank 
or central bank squeezing the flow of credit to Russia. In the monetary 
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to shut off their ordinary trade credits to Russian firms found that the 
Russian government pulled out still other deposits in  large amounts, 
payable to other banks for new loans to the inconvenienced Russian 
firms (Lindert 1969, 29-31).  Thus in a variety of ways, Russia made 
any attempt to stop lending costly to her creditors. 
2.2.4  Global Returns to Lenders, in the Bond Era and since 1973 
Combining the ten countries’ diverse experiences, table 2.3 shows 
that investors made more on bond lending to foreign governments than 
on  safer home governments, despite the revolutions  and the Great 
Depression.’  Foreign  bondholders got a net return premium  of  0.42 
percent per annum on all bonds outstanding anytime between 1850 and 
1970 (with payments carry-over traced through  1983). Curiously enough, 
the bonds issued in the troubled years between  1915 and 1945 fared 
better (for creditors) than those issued back in the prewar golden age. 
The bonds issued between 1850 and 1914 barely broke even with home- 
government bonds in the ex post measures used here, while those from 
1915-45  realized  a premium of 1.13 percent. 
Were the realized returns on foreign bonds better or worse than those 
on lending to private domestic corporations? The only  suitable com- 
parison  at hand  is  with  W.  Braddock Hickman’s landmark study of 
U.S. corporate bonds (1958, 75-138;  1960). Our ten foreign govern- 
ments repaid a nominal interest rate of 4.68 percent, versus 3.85 percent 
on home-government  bonds, between  1850 and 1983 (table 2.10). In 
the troubled era 1900-43, Hickman’s large U.S. corporate bonds repaid 
a lifetime  return of 5.4 percent, versus an average return on home- 
government bonds  somewhere near the  1850-1983  average.  At face 
value, this would suggest that foreign government debt paid a bit less 
well than gambling on the fortunes of U.S. corporations. But Hick- 
man’s measures may be too optimistic about U.S. corporate bonds. 
He gives them generous subsequent-market valuations,  both by fol- 
lowing bonds across an era of declining nominal interest rates and by 
assuming that defaulted bonds were later redeemed at the favorable 
prices that only some of them fetched in the 1940s. For now, pending 
more detailed  research, one should  say  only  that there is  no clear 
evidence of  a systematic difference in the realized returns on foreign- 
government and domestic-corporate bonds. 
Have creditors fared better or worse on loans to foreign governments 
since 1973? We  must first note that lending institutions have changed. 
Bond  lending  has been  very  modest, even in  the  1974-82  wave  of 
optimism. Far more important are direct bank loans to governments. 
The maturities are generally shorter than those on the earlier bonds, 
and interest rates are quoted as premia over the variable London In- 
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1  percent above LIBOR (as table 2.6  will show below), but LIBOR is 
not the most relevant alternative rate. More appropriate are rates on 
U.S. government bonds of the same maturity. The contracted (ex ante) 
premium on Third World loans, like the earlier bond-era premia, was 
about 2 percent over interest rates on U.S. government bonds. 
Are the loans of the 1974-82  wave being fully repaid? So far, despite 
the landmark Brazilian suspension of  payments in February 1987, the 
answer is “maybe.” The flurry of reschedulings in the period  1982-86 
has had little effect on the realized rates of return. Borrowers repaid 
private creditors on contract, and were given little relief. To  be sure, 
financial markets have come to expect a breakdown  of debt service. 
As  of  mid-1987,  the informal secondary market for banks’ loans to 
problem debtors tended to discount these loans by about one third in 
most cases, with a much steeper discount on Bolivian debt. Top U.S. 
banks have posted over $16 billion in reserve-addition loss, much of it 
an expected loss on foreign debt. Similarly, the initial fears after the 
Mexican crisis of  1982 and later shocks depressed bank stocks (Kyle 
and Sachs 1984, Ozler 1986). Yet these expectations have not yet been 
reflected in any great shortfall of  realized debt service. 
How much default would  it take to make  the realized  returns on 
recent  loans  match the realized  return  on bonds between  1850 and 
1970? Table 2.4 quantifies the real  rates of  return realized  on Third 
World debt since the end of 1973, under various assumptions about the 
extent of default. The three rate-of-return columns show the rates im- 
plied by actual experience up to the end of  the year in  question and 
by full repayment at the end of that year. The two columns at the far 
right measure the percentages of  default that would bring the overall 
rate of  return down to meet two norms. The first norm is simply the 
real rate of return on U.S. Treasury bonds of about the same maturities. 
The second is “history,”  or the historical premium of 0.42 percent a 
year over home-country bonds that was derived from table 2.3 above. 
Had debtor countries fully repaid their public external debts at the 
end of  1982, private creditors would have reaped a premium of  2.81 
percent a year over the (negative) real returns on having lent to the 
United States over the previous nine years. As of 1982, table 2.4  further 
implies, they could have collectively lost 15.3 percent of the total bal- 
ance and still have earned the historical-average premium over loans 
to a creditor-nation government. This did not happen, of  course. In- 
stead, the debtors made partial net transfers to private creditors, while 
most  of  the  debt  was  rescheduled  and enlarged. Curiously,  the net 
transfers to creditors of  1983-86  have been offset by a growing incon- 
venience to them. By being locked into rescheduled debts, instead of 
investing in now-more-competitive  U.S. bonds, creditors have expe- 
rienced  a drop in  their maximum possible  premium on loans to the Table 2.4  Private Real Rates of Return and Possible Default Losses on Public External Debt of 
Developing Countries, 1973-86,  under Various Assumptions about Repayments in the 1980s 
Default Variations 
Percent Capital Loss to 
Make Returns Match  If  All Debts were Fully Repaid 
Outstanding  Complete 
Debts Paid or  Internal  Real Rate  DefaUlt ---f 
Defaulted at  Rate of  of Return on  Spread  U.S. Bonds  “History”  Internal 
End of Year  Return(v/)  U.S. Bonds(p)  (v, -  p)  (V = p)  (V = p  + 0.42)  Rate v,, = 
~  ~  ~ 
1982  0.77%  -  2.04%  2.81%  17.9%  15.3%  -54.16% 
1983  I .56  0.06  I .so  11.8  8.6  -  39.69 
1984  I .97  0.47  1 .so  13.6  10.0  -  28.25 
1985  2.34  I .44  0.90  10.4  6.0  -  20.96 
I986  2.66  2.05  0.61  9.2  4.0  -  15.68 
Nores: We followed  the actual performance of all  public and publically-guaranteed  external debt for all  the 97 
Third World nations included in World Bank, World Debt Tablrs. latest available estimates deflated by the U.S. 
consumer price index. Each row in  the table represents a different year in which the debts were assumed to be 
completely settled, with the indicated degrees of default. Rates of return were defined as in table 2.3 above. All 
estimates refer to rates earned by private creditors, with initial loan fees apparently netted out of the amounts 
lent. The internal rates of return (uf)  were calculated using the end-of-1973 disbursed debt outstanding as the initial 
flow to the borrowing country.  For the purpose of calculating vf, the debt outstanding at the end of the stated 
year was assumed to be repaid in full. 
The alternative rate of return (6)  is the average of the real rates of return on seven-year U.S. Treasury bonds 
(p,)  held, and rolled over, from year t to the end of the year listed above, as an alternative to the net transfers to 
the developing country in  year t.  The average 6 thus corresponds to its formula in appendix A, except that 
discounting is forward to the end of a final year between  1982 and 1986, rather than backward to an initial loan 
date. (More precisely, p was calculated from the p,’s  for 1973-81  only, leaving alone the p,’s  unaveraged for the 
net-repayment years from 1982 on.) 
The amount of default at the end of 1982 (or 1983, . . . ,  1986) that would bring the internal rate of return (v) 
down to match the alternative rate of return (p)  equals the end-of-I982 value gained by capitalizing, at the p, real 
rates, all actual flows between the private foreign creditors and the debtor country. The same procedure is repeated 
to calculate how much default would make the ex-post returns match a premium earned by earlier generations of 
international investors. Table 2.3 found that premium to be on the order of 0.42 percent per annum. 
An additional technicality had  to be addressed for correct use of the data in  World debr  tables. The starting 
point was the set of tables on “long-term  public and publically guaranteed” (hereafter “PG”)  debt to private 
foreign creditors. Dealing with these data alone would have given a biased picture of the returns to lenders. It 
seems that each year’s flow data (new lending, repayments, and interest) refer to the population of loans classified 
as PG at the start of that year. Unfortunately, that population kept changingfrom  year to year. The key to adjusting 
for this inconsistency was to note that the change in the amount outstanding failed to match the difference between 
new loan disbursements and principal repayments. The discrepancy equalled (apart from small exchange-rate 
adjustments and rare write-downs) a net inflow of loans into the PG category from other categories (short-term 
or non-guaranteed), on which we lack detailed data. The data discrepancy made it possible to sketch a profile of 
the earlier loans that became converted into PG loans, and to include both the earlier loans and the PG loans in 
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Third World  (vf -  D).  As of the end of  1986, everything still hung in 
the balance:  the creditors would  suffer great losses if  they  received 
only the secondary-market discounted values for their loans, but if they 
were eventually bailed out, they would have received a better return 
than their pre-1973 bondholding predecessors got. 
2.2.5  No Systematic Creditor Errors? 
Despite the positive ex post returns overall, those recurring waves 
of international debt crisis tempt us to look for irrationality in investors’ 
behavior.  We  take only a few  steps in  that tempting  direction  here. 
Like persons trying to pose for an interesting photograph in  front of 
Niagara  Falls,  we  want  to get close enough  to a  subject  of general 
interest to attract the viewer. But not too close. 
Even if table 2.3 had shown overall returns below the safe-asset rate, 
economists are not willing to infer irrationality from ex post bad results. 
We  generally insist on a tougher test of asset-market inefficiency. The 
market is inefficient-it  is guilty of systematic forecasting errors-only 
to the extent that one can prove that some information  available  to 
investors could have improved  their forecasts beyond  their revealed 
valuations of assets in competitive asset markets. The appropriate test, 
then, is a regression test in which other available information signifi- 
cantly improves rate-of-return or asset-price forecasts from a sample 
when it is added to a regression already including the whole history of 
the market price of the asset. Could the holding of foreign government 
bonds “pass”  this inefficiency test? No such test has been run. An 
obvious point to pursue in later regression-based  research is: should 
not  investors have noted the level of lending  itself? The periods  of 
highest gross lending, in relation to macro-aggregates, were the periods 
just before returns dropped. In  this respect, the time pattern resembles 
the cross-sectional significance of debt ratios noted by Edwards (1986). 
Indirect clues can be gained by exploring some circumstantial  evi- 
dence. Note, in particular, the consistency in the identities of the de- 
faulters. The set of borrowing countries defaulting (wholly or partially) 
before World War I had a higher probability of default in the 1930s than 
did  other countries receiving  loans  in  the  1920s. Again,  the set of 
borrowing countries defaulting either before  1930 or in the 1930s had 
a higher probability of needing concessionary “rescheduling” of loans 
since World War 11. 
Figure 2.2 and table 2.5 summarize the historical consistency in the 
identities of the defaulters and reschedulers. The shares of countries 
falling  into problem-debtor  status (default, arrears, or, in  the  1980s, 
signing rescheduling agreements) are contrasted between two kinds of 
countries: those with and those without such status in an earlier period. 
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Historical  transition  rates  between  repayment  behaviors, 
governments of  developing countries only, 1820- 1986. Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are the numbers of  countries at each 
starting point. The numbers are affected by historical changes 
in whether a country is considered less developed. For more 
detail, see tables 2.5 and 2.8. Countries listed in table 2.8 as 
“no  loans”  in  the  starting period  of  a  transition  are not 
counted. RussiaiUSSR is included in the first transition, but 
not in later ones. 
abate, allowing a renewal  of  lending. There is  a striking pattern  of 
statistical significance. In either worldwide lending crisis (the 1930s and 
1980-86),  the problem debtors tended to be those who had had prob- 
lems earlier. The pattern holds whether one looks across all countries 
or  just across large samples of developing countries. We can reject the 
notion that repayments breakdown in crises is uncorrelated with the 
same nation’s distant debt history. Two questions immediately arise: 
Why should such patterns exist, and have international lenders taken 
due note of them? 
We  can only begin to suggest reasons for the significant legacy left 
by a country’s history of repaying, or not repaying, foreign creditors. 62  Peter H. Lindert/Peter J. Morton 
Table 2.5  Historical Rates of Transition into Problem-Debtor Status, among 
Five Periods, 1820-1986 
Among 
Among  Earlier 
Earlier Full  Problem  Difference in 
Repayers  Debtors  Transition Rates 
Earlier -+  Later 
Period  Period  n  6,  n  6d  6,,  - 6,  (Signif.) 
A.  All debtors 
1820-79 +  1880-1929  19 
1880-  1929 +  1930s  32 
1820-79 +  1930s  23 
1930s +  1940-79  22 
1940-79 -+  1980-86  118 
1820-1929 +  1980-86  24 
1930s -+  1980-86  25 
B. Developing-country debtors 
1820-79 +  1880- 1929 
1880-1929 +  1930s 
1820-1929 -+  1930s 
1930s -+  1940-79 
1940-79  -+  1980-86 
1820-1929 +  1980-86 











































































Notes: “Sovereign  debtor governments”  are national  or local governments in  those 
countries whose national government was recognized as sovereign in budget setting and 
contract law in both the earlier and the later period, and which actually received foreign 
loans within both periods. Excluded (as nondebtors) are four usually-creditor nations: 
U.S.,  U.K., France, Germany. “Problem debtors”  are those whose national  or local 
governments did not repay contracted external debt in full, whether through repudiation 
or through recorded arrears lasting more than a year or (1980-86  only) signing resched- 
uling agreements with creditors. See Table 2.8. 
n  = number of countries covered. 
6  = share of sovereign debtor governments becoming problem debtors in the later period. 
*  = difference is significant at the 5% level with a two-tailed test 
** = difference is significant at the 1%  level with a two-tailed test. 
To  avoid sloppy references to “national  character,”  later research on 
this issue should stick to exploring four paths. One argues that certain 
countries, by stint of economic history and geography, continue to be 
vulnerable to external shocks that trigger frequent debt crises. Another 
stresses the transmission of political forces from one regime to another 
causing  such macro-policy  distortions as hyperinflation,  repeatedly 
triggering general financial crises. A third is that the very experience 
of not having repaid all debts in the past adds to the national political 
legitimacy of nonrepayment in the future. Finally, creditor jitters may 63  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
invite the repetition  of  crises in  the same countries, through higher 
interest premia and  quicker flight  when  repayment  problems  loom 
(though we now turn to evidence against this fourth possibility). 
Whatever the cause of the consistency of national repayments be- 
havior, have creditors taken notice? They have indeed rationed credit 
to the Soviet bloc and China, and have continued to lend heavily to 
high-income good repayers like Australia and Canada. But among Third 
World borrowers, they have taken little note of history in their lending 
in the 1970s. Given the findings shown in figure 2.2 that default history 
raised the probability of rescheduling, both in 1980-86  and earlier, one 
would expect major banks to charge higher premia, or lend at shorter 
term, or lend less, to governments with  a default history.  They did 
slightly the opposite in  1976-79,  according to table 2.6. Governments 
with histories of default and rescheduling paid about 0.04 percent less 
in interest, on slightly longer-term loans, than governments with un- 
blemished repayment records. Repayments history, which helps predict 
subsequent repayments crises in the international  cross-section, was 
ignored. 
2.2.6  Were Defaulters Punished? 
A clearer result from the history of rates of return on sovereign debt 
relates to the ex post treatment of those who fell into arrears: The only 
ones punished were a few countries defaulting in isolation before 1918. 
Before World War I, creditor-country military power could punish an 
individual borrowing country. Such was the fate of Egypt in  1880, as 
noted above. Venezuela also capitulated to gunboat pressure, in 1902. 
The Dominican Republic’s attempt to default led to an invasion of the 
U.S. Marines and a takeover of the country’s  customs revenue in 1905. 
Nicaragua also lost her sovereignty to the Marines and to  U.S.  customs 
supervisors in  1911-12.  Mexico, Turkey, and the Soviet Union were 
denied new credits after their repudiations around World War I. 
Yet  surprisingly few debtors have been punished  since the 1920s, 
either with  direct discriminatory  sanctions or with  denial  of future 
credit. A correct reading of the relevant history is that the majority of 
nonrepayers “escaped” punishment during global crises. In the 1930s, 
debtors may have seemed to suffer cutoffs and trade retaliation, but 
the impression misleads. In that crisis and its early-postwar aftermath, 
the United States and other creditors were indiscriminate in their denial 
of fresh credits: Almost no governments in less developed countries 
got fresh loans, whether they were repaying old ones or not. A tem- 
porary gesture toward credit discrimination was the U.S. passage of 
the Johnson Act in April 1934 prohibiting private loans to foreign gov- 
ernments in  default.  But for the rest  of  the decade no loans were 
forthcoming even to governments exempt from the Act, and in July Table 2.6  Debtor History vs. Interest Premia, 1976-79 
Borrowing Experience, 1976- 1979 
Repayment 
Interest  No. of  Amount  Weighted  Record, 
Country  Premium  Loans  Lent ($ mill.)  Term (yrs.)  1980-86 
A.  Countries with no defaults or reschedulings before 1980 
Algeria  1.46%  46  2,822 
CGte d'Ivoire  1.88  9  362 
Jordan  1.30  9  340 
Korea, South  1.03  17  2,519 
Malaysia  0.92  10  1,188 
Morocco  1.21  13  2,070 
Portugal  1.02  22  1,506 
Thailand  1.03  I1  460 
7  427 
These nine  1.20%  I44  I 1,694 
Tunisia  0.94  - 
B. Countries with pre-1940 nonrepayments, none 1940-1979 
Bolivia  I .73  8  494 
Colombia  0.95  12  1,089 
Costa Rica  1.16  11  52 1 
Ecuador  1.10  21  1,395 
Greece  0.79  13  1,497 
Mexico  1.10  66  14,539 
Panama  1.52  12  87  1 
These eight  1.09  218  25,916 





















C. New post-1940 countries with reschedulings by 1979 
India  0.86  4  155  6.2 
Indonesia  1.19  17  2,773  8.2 
Philippines  -  1.24  -  28  2.953 




D. Countries defaulting before 1940 and rescheduling  1940-79 
Argentina  1.36  41  4,398  8.2 
Brazil  I .38  1 I6  10,191  9.5 
Chile  1.41  16  1,475  8.1 
Venezuela  0.82  27  6,170  7.4 
Yugoslavia  -  1.27  10  458  7s 
Uruguay  1.45  7  357  8.5 
- 
These six  I .23  217  23,048  8.6 
E. All 26  1.16  628  66,538  8.2 
countries 
F. Classijied by later repayment record (1980-86) 
12 repaying  I .09  243  20,286  8.  I 
on schedule 











d '83,r '83,'85 
r '83, '85 













r '84, '85 
- 
r 
Sources: The data summarizing borrowing experience for 1976-79  were kindly supplied 
by Professor Sebastian Edwards. They underlie  Edwards (1986, 574-77),  and draw on 
data published by the World Bank. The repayments record is from table 2.8. 
Notes: Interest premium  = percent premium over London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) 
on public and publically-guaranteed  borrowings from banks in the Eurobank market. 
r  = rescheduling. 
d  = default, as defined in table 2.8. 
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1945 exemptions were granted to every government belonging to the 
IMF and  the IBRD (International  Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment)-in  effect, to every government outside the Soviet bloc 
(Lewis 1948, 140-5,  204-6). 
Even trade policy, which had the chance to discriminate in the bi- 
lateralism of the 193Os, was not used to discriminate against defaulters 
or in favor of faithful repayers. Protectionism was too sweeping. Brit- 
ain’s Imperial Preference system might  be  viewed  as an exception, 
inasmuch  as it favored  Commonwealth  countries, who happened to 
have been faithful repayers, but even here repayment history was not 
the organizing principle.  The United  States, for its part, concluded 
reciprocal trade agreements after 1934 that favored defaulting countries 
as often  as not  (Tasca  1938, 274-75,  330-35;  Tasca  1939, chaps. 
1 and 2). The Export-Import Bank was restructured in 1936 in a way 
facilitating new loans to good neighbors,  many of  whom were Latin 
American defaulters on dollar bonds (Felix 1987, 31). 
In the postwar era U.S.  lending again failed to discriminate against 
defaulters  among  Third-World  governments.  Barry  Eichengreen 
(chap. 3 in this volume) has shown as much for the lending of  1945- 
55. And, as we have seen in table 2.6, defaulters  paid no extra premium 
when borrowing in  1976-79. 
In the 1980s, too, the signs of discrimination against problem debtors 
remain weak, at least among developing countries. Bond lending has 
virtually dried up, and the revival of bank lending has been very meager, 
for countries who have repaid faithfully as well as  for those demanding 
repeated rescheduling. Whatever the private wisdom of the pervasive- 
ness of creditor pessimism, the external cost of repayments breakdown 
seems as evident in the 1980s as in the 1930s: Some faithful repayers 
(e.g., Colombia,  Egypt) have  suffered credit contraction along with 
problem debtors. 
Thus the seeming irrelevance of repayments history in creditors’ eyes 
is itself a lesson of history. It predicts  that borrowers v%ll not suffer 
much by following the lead of Peru and Bolivia in 1984 and Brazil and 
Ecuador in  1987 in cutting repayments and demanding partial write- 
downs of debt-at  least if  they do so collectively. 
2.3.  Options for Handling Debt Crises: Some Suggestions from 
History and Theory 
A combination of history and theory offers tentative lessons on deal- 
ing with a repayment crisis once it has already broken. History’s con- 
tribution in this case is not based on the assumption that the present 
resembles the past, but on our belief  that present crisis management 
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about the lingering crisis of the 1980s is official third-party intervention, 
led by the IMF. To understand what difference this option makes in a 
debt crisis, we need to use a framework that includes the main stylized 
crisis-management options. 
2.3.1  Overview 
The starting point for analysis of a debt crisis is to define the crisis. 
The present definition is straightforward: A debt crisis exists if in the 
absence of a better offer, the debtor would rather impose unilateral 
nonrepayment  than repay fully. While there may be some incentive to 
bluff in  such matters, let us accept insistent  statements by  a debtor 
government that it “cannot”  repay fully without help or concessions 
from others as good prima facie evidence that it will not repay’ fully 
without such help. That is, as a rule of thumb, a debt crisis exists if 
the debtor says it does. 
The options for minimizing the costs of a debt crisis are unilateral, 
two-party, and three-party. The creditors have two unilateral options 
(subject  to the problem  of getting organized  as a group). They can 
impose penalties on the debtor if  he does not repay, or they can lend 
more to the debtor on the current terms. Such a net transfer of resources 
will surely be satisfactory to the debtor. If  no such unilateral aid is 
forthcoming, the debtor also has a unilateral alternative to full repay- 
ment: full or partial nonrepayment. The two-party option is one with 
a long history: The debtors and creditors can reach a compromise, each 
side bringing  its own threat to  the bargaining table. The two-party 
category  includes  cases in  which  the  debtor unilaterally  imposes a 
partial-repayment  offer that creditors cannot refuse. The three-party 
options are more complex, typically involving financial aid and other 
policy measures by an official agency such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
or the government of the United States. 
The options are conveniently judged with the help of table 2.7, which 
gives a schematic overview of the distribution of gains an losses from 
eah course of action. The simplicity of the framework may deceive. 
It is  not  based on a one-period  view  of debt negotiations.  Rather it 
stems from  a  model  of  sequential  multi-period  decisionmaking  de- 
scribed elsewhere (Lindert 1986). Its effects on different parties are 
based on capitalizations of the values of options for the future condi- 
tioned on this year’s behavior. While policy recommendations are pros- 
cribed  here, we  describe the likely effects of  each option  on world 
wealth. We  turn to the options in the order in which they are listed in 
the columns of table 2.7. 
2.3.2  By Definition, Direct Full Repayment Is Out 
A debt crisis has been defined as a situation in which  V?, the max- 
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I, exceeds VF, the maximum welfare attainable by faithfully repaying 
this year, with the option to repay or default next year.* The welfare 
inequality  Vp > Vf  is a direct translation of an inequality in  the re- 
sources available for intertemporal consumption, as detailed in a com- 
panion  paper  (Lindert, 1986). Repaying  this  year  means  giving  up 
principal  and interest. In  the framework used  here, all of  a loan is 
viewed as repayable at the end of the same year, with a new loan to 
be negotiated. If D, is the borrower’s debt at the start of the year, the 
debt service given up is (1 + rJD,,  where r, is the interest rate on the 
loan. The countervailing advantage of faithful repayment is the avoid- 
ance of  any penalty or loss of  future access to credit. We  can use PI 
to represent the capitalized direct sanctions penalty for nonrepayment, 
taking such forms as foreign-policy reprisals, disruption of the debtor’s 
foreign trade and seizure of his assets in the creditor country (Kaletsky 
1985). P,  may vary with the size of the defaulted debt. The other cost 
avoided by  repayment is B,, the capitalized  value of the borrower’s 
surplus on all future borrowing made possible by the better repayment 
record. The definition of  a debt crisis assures that the debtor would 
lose  from  repayment: P + B < (1 + r)D, if  we  drop the time  sub- 
scripts. Unfortunately, the lender would gain more by avoiding default 
than the borrower would lose. In imposing penalties, the lender real- 
istically recaptures only a fraction, a,  of the penalty imposed. The rest 
of the penalty  (1 - a)E is a deadweight loss from default, or a world 
wealth gain from repayment. Yet the borrower can impose this net cost 
by choosing default. Full repayment is ruled out in a debt crisis. 
Note that the condition defining a debt crisis does not hinge critically 
on whether or not the debtor is bankrupt. Bankruptcy is a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition for a debt crisis. If the debtor is sovereign, 
meaning that direct seizure of collateral and similar penalties are less 
than the debt service owed, [P  < (1 + r)  D],  there can be a default 
incentive (i.e., a debt crisis, with P  + B < (1 + r)  D)  even with debtor 
solvency (the debtor’s assets, K, greater than (1 + r) 0). 
2.3.3  Relending Versus Default 
A  Theorem 
The point brought out in the second column of table 2.7 is that extra 
lending at the same interest rate in a debt crisis does not remove the 
default incentive, but rather raises the amount defaulted on. If  more 
is lent by the start of this period (D  raised), the value of the debt service 
to be defaulted on at the end of the same period is raised by more than 
the costs to the debtor of defaulting. 
This result states that more debt raises the net national welfare gain, 
and the net national wealth gain, from defaulting: a(VD - VR)/aD  > 0 
and 1 + r > a(P + B)/dD. It follows from (a) the definition of a debt Table 2.7  Debt Crisis: Options for the Morning After 
Given that the debtor would prefer (or “be forced to”) default without a rescue package, the following options bring the listed capital-value payoffs 
relative 10 complete defuult  on the original loans: 
Unilateral Options 
(1)  Direct Full  (2) Extra Loans 
Party  Repayment  (AD), Same Terms 
Debtor  P+B-(I +r)D<O  A(D-P-B)>O 
Lenders  (I + r)D - aP  > 0  A(aP) - AD < 0 
Third party  - 
(rescuer) 
Two-  Party  Third-Party Rescues 
(5) Next-Year 
(3) Partial Debt  (4)  Fully Repay  Default on Easy 
Write-down  Easy Rescue Loan  Rescue Loan 
P  + B  ~  (1 + A)D 2 0 
(1  + A)D - aP  2 0  (I + r)D ~  aP  > 0  (1 + r)D ~  aP  > 0 
P  + B -  (1 + e)D  ~  MAC 2 0  P  ~  P‘  - eD 2 0 
(e  ~  r  ~  l)D + aP  < 0  -  (e - r)D < 0 
World  (1 - a)P  + B>O  -(I  - a)AP - AE  (I - a)P + B > 0  (I - a)P + B - MAC - moral  (1 - a)(P - Pe), with 
wealth  hazard costs  moral hazard Costs 
Punch lines:  Debtor won’t allow  Greater default.  Workable, though  May be dominated by (3).  Possible, dominated by 
this.  untidy.  (3). 





MAC  = macroeconomic adjustment costs imposed on debtor as part of the rescue package, 
P 
P‘ 
= share of  default penalty recoverable by creditor as collateral (asset  seizure), 
= capitalized benefits to debtor from future credit rations, 
= initial outstanding loan from banks to debtor, 
= interest rate on concessionary (“easy”) rescue loan (e < r), 
= revised interest rate forced onto lenders (A < r), 
= penalty inflicted on the debtor for default on initial loan, 
= penalty inflicted on the debtor for default on initial rescue loan, 
and  r  = interest rate on original loan. 
Nore: The results under (1) and (2) are derived at length, and those under (3)-(5)  are hinted at, in a multi-period model in  Lindert (1986). 69  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
crisis (i.e., a situation in which  (1 + r)D > P + B),  and (b) the plau- 
sible condition that the elasticity of default costs with respect to the 
amount of debt be less than unity that: 
a(P + B)/aD < 
(P + B)ID 
This is almost surely true. For one thing, aBlaD < 0: Allowing extra 
lending to take place reduces the untapped borrower’s surplus by in- 
creasing the ration  of  credit toward the unattainable complete-trust 
amount of lending where the borrower’s surplus stops growing with 
the ration of credit. In addition, the direct penalties against defaulters 
have a fixed-cost component. It is plausible to assume that the first 
little bit of debt repudiation damages the debtor’s standing substantially, 
leaving less increment in penalty available for punishing extra levels 
of default. In other words, dPlaD < PID < (P  + B)/De9 
Once these premises are granted, the inadvisability of extra lending 
follows. Relending in a debt crisis magnifies the Ponzi-scheme aspect 
of overlending to a sovereign debtor. Whether it raises or lowers the 
cost to the world cannot be said with certainty, but it cannot reverse 
that net cost, a cost made more certain by the raising of the debtor’s 
default incentive. 
Myths about Relending and “Panic Risk.” 
Is there no case in which creditors in the aggregate can gain by lending 
more in a debt crisis? No, not with sovereign debt. 
Earlier defenses of the idea of relending to debtors threatening non- 
repayment are either flawed or inappropriate to the case of sovereign 
debt. One flawed view stresses an ability-to-pay dynamic. The simplest 
variant dates back at least to Domar:’O If only the debt can grow faster 
than the rate of interest, every individual loan can be repaid. A more 
popular variant argues that all is well if  the debtlexport ratio is kept 
from rising by having export growth outstrip the interest rate (Cline 
1983, 46-72;  Cline  1985, 36-45;  Avramovic  1985; Dornbusch  1985, 
343-83;  Dornbusch and Fischer 1985,60-65; Feldstein 1986). It is used 
with favor in writings by the World Bank and policymakers in debtor 
countries (e.g., World Bank 1985,50-53; Simonsen 1985). But as shown 
elsewhere (Lindert 1986, 3-6),  the popular  variant  is just  Domar’s 
variant in disguise, since the export terms cancel out. Both variants 
fail  to note or correct the fact that infinite  relending to a  sovereign 
debtor in a debt crisis is a Ponzi scheme. Nor do they note that even 
on this view’s own terms, the crisis is avoided only ifthe lenders are 
chained to repaying themselves  forever. 
The best theoretical case for relending at the brink of default is one 
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for some time without income, then gets a random income that might 
allow repayment. Once the stream of lending has begun, moral hazard 
sets in. The borrower overconsumes in the initial period, running low 
on funds and demanding more. Despite the clear danger of bankruptcy, 
the creditor rationally yields and relends to save at least the possibility 
that the borrower will get rich and repay. Hellwig assumes that bank- 
ruptcy settlements hold such clubs over the borrower that he will want 
to repay  if  at all possible  (1977, 1883-85).  Since the issue becomes 
whether or not the borrower is able to repay, involuntary relending is 
indeed rational (given the questionable decision to start lending in the 
first place). But Hellwig’s model, while correct, cannot be applied to 
the case of  sovereign debt, since his key assumption rules out debtor 
sovereignty. The sovereign debtor would still ask whether he had an 
incentive to repay, even after becoming rich. The present result is not 
contradicted. 
The present  result also challenges the usual description of  “panic 
risk,”  the danger that individual lenders will stampede to stop lending 
when a default incentive looms and triggers a capital loss for all cred- 
itors. The usual story is that their pursuit of individual security ruins 
the collective creditor interest. The formation of lending syndicates is 
one device for solving the “free-rider” problem among already exposed 
creditors.I2  There is reason to question, however, whether the “panic 
risk” or “free-rider” problem really exists during a rush to stop lending. 
It could exist, of  course, if  those who panicked were misjudging the 
ability of the borrower to repay all debts. But if they are fleeing because 
they correctly perceive that the debtor has an aggregate default incen- 
tive, panic by individual lenders does not impose any special cost, any 
“panic risk,”  on the whole community of  creditors.I3 What is wrong 
with the usual discussion of  panic risk and free riding in  the context 
of sovereign debt is its assumption that creditors’ collective interest is 
served by  continuing to relend in a debt crisis. It is not. If the debtor 
has a default incentive, those creditors why continue to relend are not 
averting the capital loss that panic  would bring. They are only pre- 
tending it does not exist-and  are magnifying its present discounted 
value by  relending. 
2.3.4  Two-Party Debt Renegotiation 
As a Game 
The debtor and creditor(s) can reach a compromise that gives each 
side something better than its unilateral alternative. Each can use its 
unilateral option as a threat point. The debtor has the default option, 
precluding full repayment as a debt crisis outcome. Column (3) of table 
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he gets just enough reduction in interest rate (from r down to  A)  to 
match the perceived gains of default. The creditors gain by avoiding 
default, recapturing enough of their investment, (1  + A)D, to outweigh 
the seizure value of the debtor’s assets, aR  The latter (aP  for them, 
costing the debtor P) defines their threat point. The lower it is, the 
more the informed debtor can force creditors to write down debt ob- 
ligation~.’~  The two  parties  are likely to find  a bargaining  solution 
between the two threat points. In at least one formal model, they do 
find such a compromise under special assumptions (Bulow and Rogoff 
1986),  but there is no general theorem establishing a smooth bargaining 
solution. 
How It Worked in the Bond Era 
The two-party approach worked as well as could be expected before 
World War I. The exact outcomes varied with circumstances. At the 
benign noncrisis  extreme, there  were  uncontroversial  reschedulings 
that  preserved  the contractual  capitalized  value of  debt while post- 
poning (and magnifying) nominal service obligations to meet a pure- 
liquidity problem. 
Of the cases involving real give and take, three prewar Latin Amer- 
ican  examples illustrate  the flexibility of  two-party  bargaining.  One 
solution was reached between Mexico and her creditors in  1885-86. 
Eager to attract fresh foreign capital, incoming President Diaz signed 
three decrees on 22 June 1885 cutting government spending and offering 
a partial repayment of  old foreign debts, but refusing to pledge any 
special government revenue to creditors. A year later these terms were 
accepted  by  the Corporation of  Foreign Bondholders, and other ar- 
rangements were  soon worked out regarding  Mexico’s non-London 
debts. Lending resumed until the revolution (Turlington 1930, 171 -21 1; 
Wynne 1951, 30-47). 
The Romero Plan (Arreglo Romero) of July 1893 revised Argentina’s 
foreign public debts along similar princip1es.l6  Argentina was excused 
from 30 percent of  interest payments for five years and from all am- 
ortization for eight years. Still in arrears despite a funding loan in 1891, 
Argentina was able to convince her private creditors that this was the 
best they would be offered. Creditworthiness, fresh inflows, and faith- 
ful repayment ensued. Financial rehabilitation owed less to fiscal belt- 
tightening then to a revival in demand for Argentina’s exports from 
the late 1890s on (possibly helped by undervaluation of the peso after 
its stabilization). 
The Brazilian funding loans of 1898 and 1914, organized by the Roth- 
schilds, showed how private-bank conditionality differed with circum- 
stances. The  1898 loan required  that  Brazil retire  some of  her note 
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Brazil got very little debt reduction, the loan calling primarily for value- 
preserving postponement of service, akin to the pure “rescheduling” 
packages of the 1980s. As Fishlow (1985 and 1987) has noted in this 
context, “[flunding loans were not all finance and no adjustment,” and 
in 1898 Brazil was prepared to take little direct financial relief and some 
adjustment for the sake of regaining creditworthiness. In 1914 she gave 
up less. In the eyes of creditors as well as her own, Brazil’s troubles 
were not self-inflicted, but stemmed from a sudden plunge in her terms 
of  trade on world markets, warranting  renewed credit after a minor 
rescheduling. 
The same workability could not be recaptured, of course, in the wake 
of the Mexican and Russian revolutions. In both aftermaths, creditors 
held  no effective clubs over the postrevolutionary governments-no 
extra sanctions (P)  that were not being imposed anyway, and no cred- 
ible promise of generous future credits (bringing borrower surplus B) 
to compensate repayment of large past debts. No system was likely to 
succeed in averting default in these cases. 
The same applies to the 1930s. Bargains were struck repeatedly, but 
each settlement was promptly breached by the debtors. As the present 
analysis of debtor incentives implies, repayment collapsed because, in 
effect, P and B plunged to zero. Threats of penalties against a debtor 
country were not credible, given that so many countries defaulted and 
that international trade and trade finance could hardly be made worse 
by vindictive creditors. Nor was there any reasonable prospect of re- 
newed lending large enough to tempt most debtors into faithful repay- 
ment. The breakdown of the 1930s shows only that a worldwide collapse, 
which was not due in any large degree to the international debt defaults, 
posed a problem so great that no bargaining  solution could work, no 
matter who helped out. 
2.3.5  The Three-Party Approach 
By contrast, international debt settlements in the postwar world are 
governed in part by  international  agencies ready to intervene in the 
debt-bargaining process-the  International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Paris Club-and  by the hegemonic lobbying efforts of the 
United  States government on behalf  of  sound international  finance. 
Outright repudiation  has largely been replaced  by those other “re-” 
words:  rescheduling,  refinancing,  restructuring,  renegotiation.  The 
consensus is that this intervention  has helped avoid the instability of 
the 1930s. Yet  there are reasons to question the consensus. The im- 
perfect  bilateralism of the bond  era may  have been a more realistic 
approach to the inherently untidy problem of sovereign debt than the 
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Its Postwar Evolution 
The evolution of the three-party approach can be divided into three 
postwar stages for expositional  purposes. Before  about  1955, when 
governments borrowed abroad mainly  from  other governments, re- 
scheduling was also bilateral. The troubled debtor got assistance di- 
rectly from an agency of the lending government, such as the export- 
import bank. Concessionary refinancing,  like Marshall Plan aid, was 
an American  affair.  The IMF and  World  Bank  still  concentrated on 
their initial priority tasks, the balance of payments and development 
loans, respectively.  This earliest phase resembled  the two-party ap- 
proach of column (3) in table 2.7. 
Between about  1955 and about  1979 the supply  curve of  conces- 
sionary third-party financing shifted out. The Fund and Bank began to 
assume a greater and greater third-party role in debt refinancing (Bit- 
termann  1973, chap. 3). In some cases, they merely  provided  good 
offices, as an informed catalyst in negotiations between other govern- 
ments. In others, they, especially the IMF, laid out formulas for mac- 
roeconomic adjustment in the borrowing country. And in some cases, 
they  actually  contributed to the refinancing  package,  with  loans on 
their own separate terms. Their supply of concessionary financing may 
have been raised by the establishment of explicit Fund conditionality 
between 1952 and 1955, a move that may have raised the contributions 
of their conservative main  subscriber, the United  States (Dell  1981, 
9-12).  Essentially the same policy guidelines for the supply of conces- 
sionary finance have remained intact since. 
After  1979, and especially after the debt crisis broke in  mid-1982, 
the demand curve for refinancing shifted far to the right. Debtors’ first 
recourse was, as usual, to  their immediate creditors. By 1979, however, 
these creditors were private banks whose exposure had risen to heights 
not approached since the 1920s. The private banks were more reluctant 
than the earlier government creditors to write down the debt obligations 
due them. They suffered greater exposure, lacked any foreign-policy 
motivation to make concessions to a foreign government, and (in the 
United  States) were (and still are) constrained by law to declare any 
loan with interest arrears to be “nonperforming,”  forcing a write-down 
of net worth. What private creditor banks have  sought in the crisis 
since 1982 is an extension of third-party rescue, the policy  that was 
emerging in the 1955-79  period. The surge in demand for third-party 
help posed a delicate policy issue. 
Third-Party Rescues in Principle 
To judge the potential and the perils of third-party rescue packages, 
let us first describe this approach as an ideal type and then compare it 
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A stylized third-party rescue would lead to the cost-benefit account- 
ing sketched in column (4)  of table 2.7 above. The third party (e.g., 
the IMF or World  Bank) grants a  rescue loan at the lower interest 
rate, e,  which the debtor uses to pay off private creditors at the higher 
interest rate, r. The private creditors recapture their money in full, and 
the debtor gets a reduction in its external liability. The rescuer, with 
money ultimately raised from taxpayers, subsidizes the combination 
of the first two parties, giving interest-rate relief (e < r) that is split 
between the debtor government and its private ~redit0rs.I~  The two 
parties thus gain, relative to the bond-era institutions forcing them to 
bargain only with each other. The world benefits in exactly the same 
way as with two-party negotiations: It saves the deadweight loss from 
the retaliatory penalties, or (I - a)Z? subject to subtler costs discussed 
below. 
Which side tends to capture the subsidy-the  debtors or the credi- 
tors? No  simple answer can be firmly given,  but  there is reason to 
suspect that the creditors are the larger proximate beneficiaries. Their 
gain is the more tangible, at least: They get repaid the full risk-elevated 
interest rate (r) on their loans, whereas two-party bargaining  would 
have forced them to accept a write-down (A < r).  The debtors are given 
enough to forestall default (though it could return, as column  (5) in 
table 2.7 warns). 
Three Extra Costs 
Subsidizing international lending on insufficient collateral would not 
seem so costly if  one just looked at the subsidy wedge and the likely 
elasticity of long-run overlending response as a percentage of world 
product, calculated on the back of an envelope. The effect on world 
wealth  could  be  as  low  as  that  in  the  two-party  settlements  of 
column (3). There are three subtler costs, however: moral hazard costs, 
macroeconomic adjustments costs, and costs of delays in settlement. 
A third-party  rescue involves an extra moral hazard not present in 
the two-party case.18 That subsidy tied  to the write-down  (e - r)D 
encourages the type of lending  wave  that creates debt crises. Yet  it 
captures only those immediate world gains, (1 - a)P + B, that two- 
party settlements could have captured without the extra moral hazard. 
Rescue packages  involving  the IMF also impose macroeconomic 
austerity on the debtor countries (via conditionality). Austerity is not 
a bad in itself. In fact, given the frequent bias toward inflated govern- 
ment payrolls,  monetized  deficits,  and inflation,  austerity can be its 
own reward from the viewpoint of the adjusting nation. The IMF could 
continue to offer incumbent policymakers  its services as the classic 
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giving them the extra political chance to survive until the whole nation 
reaps the longer-run gains from austerity. 
The issue here is not the idea of conditionality, but its current mar- 
riage to repayment of private creditors. In the 1980s, IMF conditionality 
has imposed macroeconomic adjustments in relation to the debt hang- 
over, not just in relation to the macroeconomic need for austerity in 
the debtor country. Some countries might be pressured too much, oth- 
ers too little.  To  the extent that there  is merit in  correcting debtor- 
country macropolicies just to encourage international creditworthiness, 
that is a task that might be left to private conditionality (Friedman, in 
Williamson 1983), just as it  was in  the two-party  bargaining before 
World War I. The Fund has the option of concentrating its conditionality 
on the seriousness of macroeconomic overheating in the debtor country. 
A third  subtle cost of  the three-party approach is a cost of  delay, 
which has become evident in the wave of  reschedulings in  the 1980s. 
Unlike the ideal concessionary third-party relending of  column (4) in 
table 2.3, the involvement of  the IMF and the World Bank has not 
brought  significant relief to debtors and has not resolved  the uncer- 
tainties of the debt overhang. To  be sure, dozens of rescheduling and 
refinancing agreements have been  signed. Yet  the terms involve no 
clear write-down of debt. While debtors’ demand for liquidity has been 
assisted by debt rollovers with grace periods, the rescheduling loans 
tend to involve a higher interest-rate spread over LIBOR. Of the four- 
teen  leading debtors  whose  rescheduling  in  1980-86  was  noted  in 
table  2.4 above, nine  are slated  to pay  clearly  higher spreads over 
LIBOR than those at which they borrowed in 1976-79; four (Argentina, 
Panama, Mexico, Yugoslavia) are paying spreads both above and be- 
low, but averaging above, their 1976-79  rates; and only the B-loan to 
Cdte d’Ivoire is below the 1976-79 average rate (Watson et al., 1986, 
106-22). While one could argue that the rescheduled rates over LIBOR 
might be below the shadow price of  funds given the debt crisis, they 
do not concede any write-down of existing debt. 
Why has little or no debt relief yet been offered to debtors in the ne- 
gotiations of the 1980s? While the issue must remain open to debate, we 
hypothesize that the intervention of the Fund and the Bank has impeded 
the striking of bilateral bargains between debtor governments and the 
creditor banks. Debtor countries seeking debt relief are also shopping 
for concessionary new loans from the Fund and the Bank. Under current 
practice, an impasse arises-or  is imposed by creditor resistance. IMF 
policy generally proscribes agreement with a debtor country for con- 
cessionary finance in  exchange for domestic belt-tightening until the 
country has reached an agreement restoring good standing with private 
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financing is explicit in the Fund’s pursuit of “co-financing”  packages 
since 1982. Knowing this, the main banks have the option of holding out 
for repayment at or near the original high interest rates. With official aid 
held hostage, the debtor resorts to buying time, remaining current on 
debt service and signing short-run rescheduling agreements involving 
little or  no relief. The delays continue, and cloud capital formation, until 
the debtor gives up on the process-a  resignation seemingly signalled 
by Brazil in February 1987. 
The three-party approach thus has extra problems, the magnitudes 
of  which  depend on whether the approach is truly followed or only 
simulated. A genuine rescue, by reducing debt service, poses a moral 
hazard. It subsidizes the combination of debtors and lenders, inviting 
future waves of overlending. It also distributes costs of macroeconomic 
austerity according to foreign debt outstanding, rather than according 
to the severity of domestic macroeconomic disequilibrium. If the three- 
party approach is only simulated, as in the indecisive reschedulings of 
1980-86,  time is wasted, prolonging  uncertainties that may  depress 
capital  formation. One way  or the  other, the three-party approach 
seems to offer lower world wealth than the two-party approach. 
2.3.6  A Note on Creditor Distress 
An obvious fear about the suggestion just raised is that leaving lend- 
ers to their own devices threatens financial instability.  In an unlikely 
extreme case, if  their full Third World exposure were a capital loss, 
the nine top U.S. banks would be insolvent. Is there not a case for an 
official  bailout  to avert the  financial  panic  that  might  attend  their 
bankruptcy? 
The issue of financial panic definitely cannot be resolved in the space 
available here. It is one on which  reasonable people may differ. Yet 
we would be remiss if we did not indicate our own views on this issue, 
an issue naturally raised anew by our interpretation of the evidence 
above. 
We  suggest three reasons why such a concern does not make a case 
for policies rescuing shareholders and managers of the troubled banks. 
One minor reason is that panic probabilities can be invoked only when 
the kind of default possible exceeds lenders’ exposure and the lenders 
are major financial institutions. In most cases, the two-party bargaining 
process would  predictably  yield  an outcome in  which  the creditors 
suffered only a partial default. Neither they nor the debtor countries 
on the other side of the table have an incentive to let the main creditors 
fail. A  second restraint on the fear of financial destruction is that a 
major U.S. bank in serious trouble can be purchased by any of several 
already-willing suitors (e.g., First Interstate, Sumitomo, etc.), with its 
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tions, and physical capital need not be dismantled and auctioned off 
in uneconomical parts. 
Above all, history reminds us that a key line of defense for avoiding 
financial panics  stemming from  bank  insolvency  (whether bank  in- 
vestment policies are at fault or not) is to protect the nonequity claim- 
ants on the insolvent  banks. Given a capital loss on the banks’ (or 
other private creditors’) assets, the central bank or other rescuer bears 
only the same or less cost by defending nonequity claimants as it would 
bear by  sheltering shareholders’ net worth against any capital loss at 
all. The U.S. bank failures of  the early  1930s did not show that the 
“lender of last resort” needed to protect banks’ shareholders, but that 
it should have protected depositors and other claimants, calming more 
fears with less official loss and less moral hazard. And, back in the 
international sphere, the Bank of  England followed a similar strategy 
in the Barings Crisis of  1890. When Barings was threatened with in- 
solvency because of  its Argentine investments, it was liquidated and 
reorganized with some loss of partners’ equity. The claimants on Bar- 
ings were rescued first, with the Barings partners’ equity left at market 
risk. No tidal wave of panic resulted (Clapham 1958, 2:325-39). 
2.4  Conclusions 
There is a growing body of literature in which lessons are carefully 
drawn from comparisons of  the  1980s debt crisis with earlier crises 
involving international lending to sovereign debtors. This chapter con- 
centrates on two sets of issues: the long-run patterns of behavior toward 
international lending, and the policy options for dealing with debt crises 
after they have hit. 
On the private returns to such lending, we get a mixture of results: 
1. On the whole, lending to foreign governments has brought inves- 
tors a higher real rate of return than the alternative of  lending to their 
own governments, despite foreign defaults. Between  1850 and about 
1970, lenders were promised about a 2 percent ex ante premium on the 
bonds of  ten foreign governments,  and ended up with about a 0.42 
percent ex post premium. In the wave of lending since 1973 the ex ante 
premia were again about 2 percent over home-government bonds. The 
ex post returns still depend heavily on future repayments, subject to 
the constraints quantified in table 2.4. Debaters over the need for official 
intervention into the international-debt sphere cannot yet cite any past 
aggregate shortfall in investors’ private returns. 
2. For a subset of  major government borrowers, the crises of  non- 
repayment have been deep enough or frequent enough to make their 
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The foreign bond  debts of Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey have 
offered negative net returns. Investors had foreseen some likelihood 
of default in three of these four cases, charging higher than average ex 
ante interest premia (Russia is the exception here). 
3. There is a significant historical consistency in the identities of the 
countries defaulting. Countries that had defaulted before  1929, for ex- 
ample, were more likely  to default  in  the  1930s than  were others. 
Similarly, countries that had  defaulted or needed concessionary refi- 
nancing before 1980  were more likely to be in arrears or  get rescheduling 
agreements in the 1980s. 
4. Defaulting  debtors were not  consistently  punished. There were 
only  a few  early  cases where countries trying  to default  in  visible 
isolation  led  to direct sanctions and discriminatory  denial of future 
credit. Most  of  the defaults occurred in the worldwide crises of the 
1930s-and  possibly the 1980s-when  uncooperative debtors suffered 
no more than cooperative ones. 
For international debt crises in full swing, there is no tidy solution, 
because of the inherent defects of unenforceable lending. We  rank the 
available options according to their likely world-wealth effects, arguing 
from a mixture of history and theory that 
5. In a debt crisis, merely relending to the  same borrower on the 
same terms (pure “rescheduling”) must lower creditor and world wealth, 
given that it was necessitated by the borrower’s credible threat to cut 
repayments unilaterally if no lending occurred. 
6.  The older direct two-party bargaining of the bond era, in which 
debtors and creditors turned to partial repayment plans, had a mixed 
record. Revolutions and the Great Depression brought sweeping debt 
repudiation and credit cessation, but other cases were resolved much 
more smoothly. Direct two-party bargaining can be said to be workable, 
if  untidy. 
7.  The modern three-party approach, with  international  agencies 
intervening in debt crisis negotiations,  introduces three further com- 
plications beyond those of the imperfect two-party bargaining  of the 
bond era. First, the experience of the 1980s finds that the three-party 
approach has produced short-run cosmetic agreements with little clear 
resolution of the underlying disagreement over resource transfer. The 
attending delays may have prolonged investment uncertainty. Second, 
if truly concessionary rescue loans had been forthcoming, they would 
have brought moral hazard, inviting further waves of private gambling 
on foreign sovereign debt. Finally, further work is needed to determine 
whether third-party (e.g., IMF) pressure for macroeconomic adjust- 
ment has become less correlated with  the need for such adjustment 
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Appendix A 
Data Sources and Data Processing for 
the Bond Sample 
Overview of Data Sources 
Bondholders’  Watchdog Annuals 
The most important of these were the annual reports of the British 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB). The series dates from 1873, 
and the approximate period of full detail covers the half-century from 
1885  to  1935. During this  interval, the typical  issue comes in  three 
parts: a brief narrative account of such country-specific important events 
as new issues, negotiations, defaults and consolidations; a more quan- 
titative  series of  country appendices; and finally, a brief summary of 
“Principal  Loans in Default.”  CFB tries to report all obligations of 
debtor governments,  but  its  coverage of  sterling issues is  of  higher 
quality than its coverage of other European and American-based lend- 
ing activities. The country appendixes try to provide  summary mea- 
sures of  debt outstanding and total debt service for some countries, 
but the terms of  aggregation cannot be relied upon to be consistent 
from one year to the next. For the purposes of this project we did not 
make any use of aggregated information from CFB or any other source, 
but instead applied our own aggregation methods to the information 
on individual issues. During the late 1930s the quality of the reporting 
deteriorates rapidly. The editors blame the manpower demands of  World 
War 11, but the timing of the decline suggests that the real cause may 
be demoralization and shortage of funds associated with the massive 
wave of  default of the early  1930s. Reports continue to issue until at 
least the mid-l970s, but are usually inferior in quality to other sources 
available for this period. 
By the 1930s several other annual publications are available to sup- 
plement those of the CFB. The American-based Foreign Bondholders’ 
Protective Council (FBPC) was patterned after the CFB, and provides 
very good coverage of  American issues outstanding during the 1930s 
and 1940s. FBPC data have been of special value in tracing the details 
of patchwork funding arrangements for Latin American  debt during 
the 1930s and its subsequent liquidation during the 1940s. It is also of 
great value in tracing the arrangements made to adjust Japanese debt 
during the post-World  War I1 period. By comparison to CFB, however, 
it gives less attention to issues of foreign (here, non-American) origin. 
The best American annual source of debt information is that provided 
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source of information for debts to all countries around the year 1930, 
creating a period of overlap with the CFB coverage. Fortunately, the 
Moody’s and CFB figures reconcile quite well during this period. 
Occasional Compendia 
Certain other publications which were not issued on an annual basis 
also contributed extensively to the data base. For the interval 1850 to 
1885, before  the period  of greatest reliance  on CFB data, the  chief 
sources were Hyde Clarke  (1879) and  Fenn  (1874,  1889, and  1898). 
Thereafter, we consulted the American compendia Fitch (1918), Kim- 
ber (1925), Kimber and Nagel  (1933), and Dominick  and Dominick 
(1934,  1936). These sources constituted the most detailed summaries 
of debt outstanding at points of time, and the preferred research strat- 
egy was, where possible, to jump from one compendium to the next, 
falling back upon the annual publications only when necessary to re- 
solve conflicts or focus on particular years of interest. 
Country Studies 
The third most important class of information source for this project 
consisted of special studies, usually devoted entirely to a single country. 
Perhaps the best of these were those included in Wynne (1951). From 
this work we made use of chapters devoted to Egypt, Mexico, and 
Turkey. Three other important resources were Peters (1934), Turlington 
(1930), and Ludwig (1989,  devoted respectively to Argentina, Mexico, 
and Brazil. 
For each country, coverage typically moved from one dominant source 
to another. In trying to keep the reader informed about the passing of 
dominance from one source to the next, we do not mean to imply that 
the secondary sources were disregarded; only that in most cases they 
were found to be redundant. 
Sample Design Strategy 
Dejinitions of  “Sovereign”  and “External” Debt 
The mass of data available from the sources mentioned  above was 
assembled for the benefit of contemporary investors, not subsequent 
scholars. Definitions and categories shift over time and make it nec- 
essary to apply some criteria in deciding what to include and what to 
leave out. The most important case in point here is that of government 
guaranteed railroad debt. In many  sample countries this category of 
investment was at least  as important an avenue  of capital inflow as 
direct government bond issue, but it is not included in this study be- 
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able against nonsovereign private borrowers before any guarantee could 
be invoked. Also, these sorts of flows are very  poorly  documented 
until their failure makes them direct government obligations. When this 
happens, it is usually  necessary to treat them as new inflows at the 
time of the activation of the guarantee. Where possible, of course, we 
tried to include as much of the original issue information as could be 
retrieved. 
In the same sense it was not always clear which  issues  should be 
considered truly external. The general criterion employed here is that 
real foreign debt should be issued and serviceable abroad, and should 
be redeemable in foreign currency. In some cases such as that of Ar- 
gentina, this test is met by certain bonds explicitly denoted k ‘internal,” 
because of the need to circumvent a legislative ceiling on interest pay- 
able on “foreign”  debt. These were included in the study, while the 
Argentine mortgage instrument known as a “cedula,” which was ap- 
parently  popular in European portfolios  during the last century, was 
left out except where service was specified to be made in gold values. 
Throughout the process of data collection, we were mindful of the 
fact that  some international  lending  is  motivated  more by  strategic 
considerations than by  expectation of  financial  return. Thus we ex- 
cluded all government-to-government  transactions associated with the 
two world wars. In the post-World  War I1 regime, however, the dividing 
line was not so obvious, given a proliferation of international financial 
intermediaries  who were subject to some degree of manipulation on 
behalf of the global interests of the lending country governments. Here 
the sorting task became very difficult. In one case, that of Turkey, we 
observed some surprisingly low ex post rates of return on post-World 
War I1 dollar debt, which were not due to default. Whether they were 
due to unanticipated  dollar inflation, or whether the loans were semi- 
concessionary from  their inception, remains unclear.  For some pur- 
poses the reader may wish to exclude them from the sample, which is 
easily done because there were no pre-World  War I1  dollar denominated 
loans to Turkey. 
Choices of Sample Countries 
Our strategy, as mentioned in the text, was to sample the greatest 
value share of all loans since 1850 at the least research cost by tracking 
the whole population of external bonds issued by the ten top foreign- 
borrowing countries. The “top”  countries were to be those with the 
greatest real gross borrowing over the whole 130-odd years. Lacking 
world data on total borrowings by country, we had to make an initial 
guess based on the secondary literature. The ten countries followed 
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estimates in table 2.1 of the stock of outstanding external debt at three 
dates. Table 2.1 reveals that we probably did not pick the top ten. In 
particular,  Chile should have been replaced  with New Zealand if  we 
were to get as close as possible to the top ten borrowers over the whole 
period. 
Yet by picking up a Latin American that defaulted in the 1930s and 
is again a problem debtor in  the  1980s, we at least made the sample 
and the task of data-gathering more interesting than if we had followed 
the history of yet another good repayer, such as New Zealand. Chile, 
we expect, will interest more readers. The switch means that our sam- 
ple is slightly biased toward nations with  troubled  histories, a slight 
bias that helps firm up some of this paper’s finding but not others. 
Choice of Sample Period  (1850-1983) 
We originally intended to build a continuous data set embracing both 
bonded  (largely  pre-World  War  11)  lending  and  direct bank  lending 
(largely post-1970) in a unified format. It did not take long, however, 
to discover that the best  data available  for the former category  of 
lending activity took the form of information about individual issues, 
whereas the information on the more recent wave of bank lending took 
the form of aggregated flows into and out of each borrowing country. 
Thus, an apparent regime shift in lending practices was accompanied 
by an apparent regime shift in reporting practices. 
The main reason for this recent emphasis on aggregate flows is prob- 
ably the fact that individual loan contracts had become too small rel- 
ative to  the  whole, too short in  their term and too flexible  in  the 
determination  of interest rates (i.e., indexation to LIBOR), to permit 
reporting on the  specifics  of  each individual  issue. It may  also be 
significant that when  sovereign loans became  permanent features in 
the portfolios of the lending banks and ceased to be traded on public 
financial markets, information on individual issues became proprietary 
to the banks themselves in a way that it had not been previously. At 
any rate, in a project  such as ours, it is apparent that such a change 
in  reporting conventions was not  accomplished  without  the loss of 
important information. One is faced with the anomaly that in spite of 
the technical advances in data handling which had taken place during 
the period  since World War 11, the quality of the available data dete- 
riorated. Any  merger  of  the two data sets would  have necessitated 
discarding the additional information available for the earlier set, mak- 
ing it impossible to draw conclusions about “anticipated”  returns as 
well as realized returns. We decided to maintain the separation in order 
to take full advantage of the richness of the data on bonded lending. 
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throughout the post-World  War I1 period as it is supplanted by the new 
practices, while the direct lending by banks explodes into prominence 
in the mid- 1970s. 
In fact, the temporal distribution of  bonded lending may be said to 
show almost  symmetric tails, accelerating from about  1850  to  1890, 
and with a phaseout period from about  1940 to 1980. It is far from a 
smooth curve, since it covers many cycles of  boom and bust, and in 
fact there is some overflow at either end. We  initiated the investigation 
at 1850 largely because the preceding two decades were almost totally 
quiescent. Several large issues were floated in the 1820s to Latin Amer- 
ica and Russia, and we used the expedient of treating the outstanding 
balances as cash inflows in the year 1850. Similarly, we assumed where 
no evidence of  default existed, that all outstanding issues were paid 
off at par in  1983, our final year of coverage. The bulk of these loans 
were to Australia and Canada and Japan, so this was probably a very 
safe assumption. (In contrast, the outstanding balances for defaulted 
loans to czarist Russia were not assumed to be repaid in 1983). 
The Collating Algorithm 
The Data Records 
The relative abundance of  information about individual bonded is- 
sues made its demands upon the available technology of  aggregation, 
particularly because of the emphasis to be placed on stacking all loan 
contracts together as if  they had a common inception year. It is pre- 
cisely here that data on aggregate cash flow totals will not suffice. In 
order to stack loans to a common origin date it is necessary to treat 
the aggregate debt service annuity payable by a sample country to its 
creditors as being composed of many substreams traceable to different 
origin dates and thus subject to different discounting schemes. For this 
purpose, we employed a system of  breaking down the history of each 
loan into annual data on debt  service, retirement,  and balance out- 
standing, so that the information could then be reassembled for the 
purpose of stacking. This will henceforth be referred to as a “collation 
algorithm,”  since its primary function is to sort and arrange data for 
convenient analysis. In all cases except that of Canada, we made use 
of the same general approach to the collating of data. The number of 
issues considered per country borrower varies widely, from 22 in the 
case of Egypt, to 439 in the case of Australia. There is great variance 
in the size of the issues, because countries differ in the extent to which 
their various subdivisions have borrowed on their own account. Canada 
represents the extreme case in  this regard, where the number of  tiny 
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For this  reason all  the results  for the 488  Canadian bonds  are pre- 
aggregated into aggregate cash flows with a spreadsheet program, with- 
out any ability to stack by origin year. 
The typical pre-World  War I1 bond issue by a sample country spec- 
ified repayment in a fixed annual sum for a specified number of years 
in return for an inflow generated by the flotation of bonds of specified 
face value.  The ability  to hold  the entire principal outstanding until 
maturity  appears to be an option that was available  chiefly to white 
commonwealth borrowers, although Japan also borrowed according to 
this  model.  When  the United  States began  lending  in  the  1920s, its 
mode of operation sometimes called for repayment in specific blocks 
of outstanding debt leading to a staggered repayment stream, but for- 
tunately these instances are uncommon. Other exceptional forms some- 
times occurred when there was lending to a sovereign under stress. 
Here interest may escalate in stages or a sinking fund may not com- 
mence  until  a specified future year.  Loan contracts may  vary  as to 
whether or not  specific revenues were pledged  as security, and  the 
degree of choice to be exercised by the creditor in specifying the cur- 
rency  of service. The agreement may  contain  provisions  about how 
bonds were to be selected for payoff; whether the borrower could retire 
ahead of  schedule; and the price, not necessarily  par,  at which  out- 
standing debt must be retired. 
All the above features might be considered contractual between bor- 
rower and lender at the time of the capital inflow. Having entered into 
the loan agreement, the creditor then faced not  only the risk  of  im- 
perfect fulfillment  of the contract by the debtor, but also the risk of 
imperfect fulfillment of expectations about prices and exchange rates. 
In order to capture the rest of  the story, source materials  must  be 
scanned for reference to ensuing irregularities, balances  outstanding, 
and dates of final retirement. New issues may give rise to new inflows, 
or consolidations  may replace one issue with a successor issue. The 
desired objective is to follow the payment history generated by a given 
loan transaction until it was extinguished at maturity, completely de- 
faulted, or paid off in some market-mediated  transaction. Consolida- 
tions or refinancing operations or settlement agreements that did not 
involve the public marketing of fresh debt were not considered suffi- 
cient reason to “restart the clock,” and the descendant issues in these 
cases were treated as originating in the year of the initial capital inflow. 
With the good data available for most publicly offered issued during 
the bond-lending era, this goal was generally attainable. 
The “Collator” Program 
The “collator”  program was used to construct a schematic repre- 
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sion in  the study. The program  accepts information  on the contract 
specifications and subsequent changes in performance for each loan, 
and targets outstanding balances for particular downstream years. It 
interpolates between the fixed points in the history of the loan to pro- 
vide a continuous track on interest, retirement, and balance outstanding 
for each year of the loan’s life.  One-time flows  which  come at the 
beginning or the end of the loan’s life are recorded in a fourth payment 
category reserved for lump-sum capital flows. 
This stage of creation of annual breakdowns for all loans manages 
to capture almost all types of performance risk faced by the lender, 
with the possible exception of  disputes involving currency of service. 
First, it takes note if  the original issue price of the bonds differs from 
par, because this results in an increase of face value outstanding which 
is  not  the  same as the amount of  the associated capital  inflow.  In 
addition, the collating procedure captures intervals of complete or par- 
tial default, or the payment of interest with retirement suspended. It 
can show changes in  terms  or face value,  or the  issuance of  cash 
bonuses which  may  come as part of  a negotiated  settlement. Most 
subtly, it incorporates an iterative procedure which uses a downstream 
year balance outstanding together with other information on the loan 
history to estimate the average price at which bonds are being retired 
by the action of a contractual sinking fund. This is useful in cases where 
countries are specifically permitted to retire their debt through purchase 
on the open market if  it is circulating below par. When prices are low, 
countries may be able to retire debt much faster than anticipated with- 
out spending more than is called for in the contract, and this is captured 
by the procedure. Unless specific mention is made to the contrary it 
is assumed that no more is being allocated to retirement than is called 
for by  the contract, and  when  retirement is observed to lag  behind 
schedule it is assumed that the loan is not being fully served. 
The original schematic loan record also includes an index section in 
which are stated some of the particulars of the loan such as its title, 
if any, its currency and power of 10, source references, and notes about 
its eventual disposition. The selection of the service currency is some- 
times confused by language which appears to permit the bearer to select 
service in a currency of choice, from among several possibilities. There 
was no clear way to resolve problems of this sort, and almost univer- 
sally it is simply assumed that the currency of service is that of  the 
major lending country associated with the flotation of  the loan. When 
a loan issues in more than one currency tranche, each tranche is con- 
sidered  to be served in  its  own currency of  origin.  Purported gold 
clauses were assumed not to be enforced in the absence of mention to 
the contrary, because in practice they seldom proved binding. The lack 
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of the predominance of dollar and sterling issues. The exchange rate 
questions arise most urgently in the case of French franc loans which 
depreciated  drastically  in  value  along  with  the  franc  after  World 
War I. Most franc lending, however, was concentrated in Turkey, Bra- 
zil, and most importantly Russia. Of  these, Turkey and Russia  paid 
little and nothing, respectively, after the abandonment of the gold stan- 
dard. Brazil paid in paper francs during the 1920s despite a decision 
of the World Court in favor of the gold clause. Before the decision 
could be fully implemented, the Brazilian debt too was in default. 
The creation of the initial loan profiles is in no instance completely 
straightforward, although it approached this state most closely in the 
case of  the best-behaved  borrowers. Many of  the sample countries 
have very contorted borrowing histories, and no array of programming 
tools can eliminate the need for spot judgment and improvision. The 
most noteworthy of these exertions are mentioned  briefly  in  an un- 
published appendix giving country histories. In general, one goal was 
achieved and one was abandoned. Each country history has been as- 
sembled out of individual loan records in such a way as  to be a coherent 
whole, but the same cannot be said for each individual loan record. 
Often a consolidation or a settlement plan would be captured only by 
the inclusion of loan records drawing together fragments of many orig- 
inal issues under one heading. Where this happened, neither the original 
issue records nor the record specifically dedicated to, say, a consoli- 
dation plan, tells a complete story about the stream of payments arising 
from  an original  market offering.  Only  when  taken together do the 
records produce meaningful net present values and rates of return on 
bonds born in the marketplace. 
To  compute the ex ante contracted returns of tables 2.2 and 2.10, 
the loan profiles for each country are then subjected to a “masking” 
program which creates a new hypothetical loan record showing perfect 
performance on the part of the borrower, regardless of how bad was 
the actual outcome. This was done by discarding all information about 
any decreases in the service flow. In these “idealized” loan records, 
the borrower is presumed never to reduce the amount remitted from 
one year to the next until the whole balance is retired. (This procedure 
is possible solely because of the observed rule that in no case was any 
loan contract observed to specify in advance a decrease in the annual 
service prior to the full repayment of the loan.) Consolidation issues 
emerging from periods of interrupted service were eliminated,  since 
under perfect performance they would never have occurred. The result 
is a new record base which can be used to calculate hypothetical “con- 
tracted” yields, and thus by contrast separate the ex post impact of 
contract nonfulfillment from the impact of movements in exchange rates 
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Summary Measures for Rates of Return and Net Present Value 
To judge the net profitability of  holding foreign sovereign debt, we 
need to compute its real internal rate of return, u,  the real rate of return 
on alternative assets, p,  and the net real present value, NPV, of  the 
sovereign debt over and above the value of a comparable investment 
in the alternative asset. The real rate of  return measure, u, must take 
into account all departures from the contracted payments schedule, 
and not be just the real equivalent of  the stated coupon rate. 
Measuring real rates of return for alternative assets requires a treat- 
ment of inflation, given that all loans are repaid in  currency. There is 
no consensus model of  price expectations. Nor is one particularly ap- 
propriate here, since the present study seeks to determine the ex post 
record rather than ex ante expectations. Our choice of price inflation 
measure is accordingly straightforward: We  use the ex post rate of price 
inflation from one period to another to convert the nominal interest 
rate on alternative assets, n, into an ex post real rate of interest, p.  The 
real rates u and p are calculated by discounting debt service flows that 
have already been deflated into constant (1913) dollars or pounds. 
What alternative assets? To highlight the distinctive property-rights 
feature of  foreign sovereign debt, one might want to contrast it with 
domestic private debt backed by full collateral. It is hard, however, to 
find a long time series on such private debt with no changes in its own 
riskiness. We  resort instead to a comparison of foreign sovereign debt 
with the rates of return on government debt of the main lending coun- 
tries, the United Kingdom and the United States. (These convenient 
time series on relatively  safe debt might make the return to foreign 
sovereign debt look good in the eyes of  readers forgetting about the 
risk differentials.) The main type of risk associated with holding U.K. 
or U.S. governments is the hard-currency inflation risk shared by the 
foreign government debt. 
To compare foreign sovereign debt with domestic (lending-country) 
government debt from the private creditor's viewpoint, we shall not 
compare the  flows of  returns  on  two equal loan  outflows.  To  keep 
accidents of the ex post timing of  commodity-price movements from 
seeming to affect the relative return on foreign government debt, we 
adopt the reverse strategy of comparing the different present valuations 
of  the same stream of  debt service on home and foreign government 
debt. The basis for this choice should be evident from the following 
algebra and discussion. 
We  define three summary measures: 
(1) The real internal rate ofreturn on foreign sovereign debt is u, as 
defined by the equation 
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where 
time T  = 
s,  = 
Pt  = 
L",  = 
the number of years to full maturity: 
the actually-repaid nominal debt service in year t,  consisting 
of both interest and principal-repayment; 
the level of consumer prices in the lending country (coun- 
tries) in year t; 
the initial  nominal  loan outflow at market price (not nec- 
essarily par), here assumed to take place fully in the initial 
year 0. 
(2)  The real net present value of the foreign sovereign debt relative 
to home-country government debt is NPV,  as defined by the equations 
NPV = zf=o  (S,/Pt)  (1 +  PO-'  - L,,/P, 
= .Y=o  (SAp,)(l + TAf  (1 + nC,)Vf  - L,j/p,, , 
where the real rate of interest from the initial year 0 to year t (or p,) 
depends on the nominal  rate on  t-year government  bonds at year 0 
(or n,) and the geometric-average rate of inflation from year 0 to year 
t (or 7,,r): 
1 + pr = (1 + nJ(1  + TJ,  so that pt = n,, - T~,,  . 
In other words, the net present value (NPV)  measures how much more 
the lenders would have to lend their own governments, beyond LJp,,, 
to get  the same stream of real  service payments they could get from 
lending just L,,/p,  to the foreign government. Of course, NPV can be 
of any sign. 
(3) The rate of return on the alternative asset is summarized in the 
effective real rate of  discount, or p, defined by the equation 
0 =  CL"  (S,/p,)  (1 + b)Ff -  X=O  (SriP,)  (1  + P,)Ff  * 
The effective real rate of discount is thus a geometric average of the 
real rates of return, the p,'s,  on lending to a lending-country  govern- 
ment. A simplification will be adopted in the measurement of p,.  As is 
implicit in its definition above, p, uses data on a single long-term nominal 
size of  interest, n,, as the rate that lenders could get by buying the 
whole service stream, instead of combining different rates on different 
maturities. This simplification seems appropriate to the degree of com- 
mitment that lenders make in buying foreign long-term (usually 30- or 
40-year) government debt. 
All three summary measures are thus shaped by the time-path of real 
ex post debt service (the S,/pr's).  The alternative asset, a loan to the 
British or U.S. government, is imagined  to pay  back the same com- 
plicated  time-stream of real  debt service that lenders experienced on 
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differ only in the real values initially lent to get the same complicated 
debt-service stream. 
To  see why  such an approach should be preferred to just using an 
ordinary government bond as the alternative asset, consider the case 
of a 40-year loan to the government of  Chile in  1878. On the typical 
pattern, Chile would pay back a fixed debt service each year with a 
somewhat larger outpayment in the final year, 1918. With what time- 
profile of British or U.S.  debt service should this foreign loan be com- 
pared? If  we chose a 40-year government bond that  was completely 
end-loaded, with  all  service coming  in the final  year  1918, the high 
prices of that year would greatly depress the rate of return on lending 
to, say, Her Majesty  back in  1878. On the other hand, if  we chose a 
British bond with a fixed nominal debt service each year for 40 years, 
we would find a relatively  high  real  rate of  return on lending to Her 
Majesty  in  1878, because  returns in  the high-price  year  1918 would 
play a smaller role in the British debt service than in the Chilean debt 
service. It is desirable to free the rate-of-return gap between Chilean 
and  British  government  debt from any spurious dependence on the 
accidents of the timing of inflation. This can be done with the formulas 
outlined  above, which  compare different  present values or different 
rates of return on the same time-profile of debt service. 
Extra inflation in any ifh  year cannot reverse the sign of NPV or the 
rate-of-return  gap v -  pi. Starting from the initial rates u and p, raising 
pi  and IT,;  ex post inflation will affect the present values of foreign debt 
(L,/p,)  and home government debt (NPV + LJp,) in the same ways: 
deflating the real value of the ifh  year's debt service and discounting it 
less rapidly by lowering the ex-post real rate of return pi = n, - T,~. 
Before any price increase in year i, that year's contribution to the NPV 
gap is 
NPVj = (Si/Pj)  (1 + p;)-i  - (Sj/Pj)  (1  + u)-i 
= (S;/p;)  (1 + n, - T<,j)-' - (S;/p,)  (1  + (v - pi) + n, - Tr<,j)-; . 
The inflationary shifts dpi and d~~~~  will  shift NPVi as follows: 
dNPV, =  -(Si/pf)  (1  + no - IT<,;)-; dpj - (iSi/pi)  (I + n, 
-  T(,j)-i-'  dT0i + (S;/pf)[l  + (u - pi) + n, - T,;]-i dpi 
+ (iSi/pi)[l  + (u - pi)  + n, -  T,~]-~-I  drTT,;  . 
The only thing keeping  dNPVi from cancelling out to zero is the ap- 
pearance of the discount-rate gap v - pi in the formula. Given that dpi 
and dri  have the same sign, 
sign (dNPVj)  = - sign (v -  pi) = - sign (NPV). 
Ex-post inflation cannot reverse the initial signs of the rate-of-return 
advantage, or the net-present-value advantage, of foreign debt. This 90  Peter H. LindertiPeter J. Morton 
desirable property led us to choose the summary measures described 
here. 
Stacking and Aggregation. 
The procedure for “stacking” loans into aggregations for summary 
measures is much the same whether it is the contracted (ex ante) or 
the realized  returns that are being summarized. One by one, the loan 
records for a particular sample country are taken from storage. They 
are filtered to discard any loan records to be defined out of the sub- 
sample in question (e.g., a subsample defined by  borrowing country 
and time period). Qualifying loans were reduced to two currencies, the 
U.S. dollar and the pound sterling. In the runs reported here, the U.S. 
dollar  stacks consisted  only  of  loans  issued  and repayable in  U.S. 
dollars, while flows in all other currencies of issue and service were 
converted into pounds sterling at the current exchange rates. Once all 
figures were in either dollars or pounds, they were converted into real 
1913 consumer bundles by following the conventional consumer price 
indexes of the United States of the United Kingdom. These real  1913 
values were reaggregated into dollars or pounds at the 1913 exchange 
rate, $4.86656 = fl.  Of course, if  the results in  question are nominal 
rather than real, the deflation step is omitted. 
For stacking into aggregates, each loan’s capital inflows, interest and 
retirement are netted into a single net cash flow, year by year. The net 
cash flows are then added across all loans. For reasons presented in 
the text, we have chosen to present results that are based on starting 
all bonds at the same abstract year of issue. Stacking therefore involves 
adding together all the net cash flows for the same number of years 
since each bond’s issue, not the same historical year. Obviously, this 
means that most of the inflows occur in the same initial year for all 
loans. As we had hoped, such all-at-once stacking reduced  the inci- 
dence of multiple sign reversals in the net flow, which could have led 
to multiple roots for the same internal rate of return. Experimentation 
showed that even when we did not follow the all-at-once rule, an it- 
erative computer routine seemed to converge on a clear and sensible 
value for the international rate of return. 
The all-at-once rule for stacking was not followed for one particular 
country, Canada. Having already slaved to enter 439 Australian loans, 
we were daunted by the prospect of tracking what would  have been 
over 600  external-currency Canadian  bonds, issued  by  all  levels of 
government down to the Saskatoon School District. We resolved to try 
time-saving short-cuts for Canada, knowing that hers was a dull story 
of good repayment (except for Alberta and a few cities). The first was 
to throw out the  subprovincial  borrowers (school  districts, Ontario 
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Dominion and the provinces. Then we  saved a little time (alas, not 
much) by  aggregating loans historically on spreadsheet files-histori- 
cally, rather than all at once, to save on file space by overlaying loans 
onto the same record. Each “loan” for Canada, as it was later entered 
on the computer, was in  fact the whole stream for a province or the 
Dominion in a particular external currency (either U.S. dollar or all 
others, aggregated into the pound sterling). By keeping most Canadian 
loans from starting as early as the others in the stacks, we lowered the 
present value of Canadian borrowing, and weighted Canada’s rates of 
return toward those earlier in history. To  view separate eras in tables 
2.2 and 2.3, we diced the Canadian profiles into period-specific flows, 
assuming full repayment at the end of each period. 
Appendix B 
Additional Tables 
(Tables 2.8-2.10 follow on pages 92- 100.) Table 2.8  A Summary of Default and Reschedulings on Government Debts to Foreign Creditors since 1820 
Nation 
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 Table 2.8  (continued) 
Nation 
Privately  Privately  Loans, Mainly  Privately 
Held Bonds,  Held Bonds,  Official,  Held Loans, 
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 Table 2.8  (continued) 
Sources: Clarke (1879);  Corporation of Foreign  Bondholders, various yeai-s; Foreign  Bondholders'  Protective Council, various years; 
Winkler (1933);  United  Nations (1948);  IBRD annual reports,  various years;  Bitterman (1973);  Hardy (1982);  Watson et al.  (1986); 
Moody's Municipal and governments manuul; Dillon and Oliveros (1987). 
Notes: 
d  = unilaterally defaulted, or  simply went into arrears, on  at least part of the foreign debt of national or  local (provincial, city)  governments 
or  utilities starting in the year listed. No attempt is made here to record when a past default was settled. 
[blank]  = not a sovereign nation anytime in this period. 
r  = negotiated refinancing on terms at least partly concessionary. 
no loans = no lending, or negligible lending, recorded in the sources cited here. 
"Egypt attempted default, but instead lost her national sovereignty. 
bRrief mention has been made of temporary nonrepayment by Portugal, before 1855 and  1891-93,  but the sources listed here offer no 
specifics. 
'Venezuela  attempted default in  1898, but by  1902 military threats had forced her to repay on contract 
Not counted as  defaults are  the breakdowns in war debts between allies, or the nonpayment of foreign debt service by countries occupied 
in war. Not counted in any totals, though listed here, are the governments of four usually-creditor countries: U.S.,  U.K.,  France, and 
Germany. 
__  ~  fully met all service obligations without rescheduling that lowered creditors'  capital value. 99  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
Table 2.9  Annual Real Net Investment by  Foreign Creditors in the Government 
Debt of Ten Countries, 1850-1982  (In millions of  dollars at 1913 
consumer prices and exchange rates. Gross new lending minus 
retirements. Excludes interest payments and changes in real value of 
outstanding debt due to changes in consumer prices.) 























































































































































































-  121.33 
-  155.94 
-4.67 
112.51 
-  152.54 
20.81 
-  123.73 
-41.25 
-40.15 
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Table 2.10  Realized Nominal Returns on Bond Lending to Ten Foreign 
Governments,  1850-1983. 
Rates of Return (9%)  (Millions of nominal $4 
Borrowing 
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5.71  3.53 
4.39  3.57 
3.62  3.90 
-  3.42  4.25 
4.76  3.70 
5.60  4.52 
4.51  2.82 
6.00  3.20 
5.48  3.86 
1.48  2.98 
-  2.28  3.54 
4.47  3.91 
4.54  3.86 
2.18 
0.81 
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Nure; The procedures used here are the same as for table 2.3, except for omitting the 
price deflation. 
Notes 
I. Sovereign debt is defined as any financial claim that is unenforceable by 
seizure of debtor assets matching the debt in value. This paper takes a con- 
ventional narrow focus on the interest-earning nonmonetary claims of private 
creditors on foreign governments. It ignores such sovereign claims as unbacked 
paper money and the debt and equity obligations of private parties who can 
take refuge behind the ineffectiveness of contract laws. 
2. For afurther summary of the lending waves and an analysis of the incidence 
of default in terms of trade shocks and fiscal policies, again see Fishlow (1985). 
3. For the years before World War I, we used the widely-publicized railroad 
bond rate. Splicing the two different rates of return together might cloud the 
comparison with foreign sovereign debt. However, the prewar railroad bond 
rate is hardly used in our calculations, since very little of the foreign sovereign 
debt was in dollars before World  War I. The returns on the large amounts of 
interwar  and postwar foreign sovereign debt in dollars were therefore  compared 
with the U.S. government bond rate, as preferred. 
4.  As  for the  higher  premia  charged  to  Canada and Japan after World 
War 11, these were elevated by the fact that Canada and Japan borrowed early 
in the postwar era, when fears about nonrepayment still lingered and when the 
interest rate on long-term U.S governments was pegged exceptionally low. 
5. In November 1931 a mixed court went further, ruling that Egypt had to 
continue to repay creditors in sterling at its gold-standard value, even though 
this meant doubling the British commodity value of the service payments. The 
protectorate government refused, however, and soon won higher-court deci- 101  How Sovereign Debt Has Worked 
sions in favor of its insistence on merely repaying the sterling value (Wynne 
6. In summarizing Mexico’s credit history, we have counted the Maximilian 
service on old loans, but have omitted any other aspect of Maximilian’s loans 
on the ground that they do not refer to Mexico. After Maximilian’s fall, the 
French government took the unprecedented step of repaying French creditors 
half  of  their  investments in  the Maximilian  loans, on the grounds that the 
government had  encouraged them to take such a risk. The same procedure 
was not  followed  after the Russian  Revolution,  however, even though  the 
French government had knowingly deceived private investors on the quality 
of czarist Russian government bonds. 
7.  Two other kinds of conclusions by conventional rate-of-return studies are 
not pursued here. First, by  following the returns to holding a bond over its 
entire lifetime, we do not disaggregate into the annual (or other short-term) 
gains that would hypothetically be realized by an investor buying, holding, and 
selling within that year. For an excellent example of the annual rate-of-return 
approach, with its heavier use of market price data, see Edelstein (1977 and 
1982). We  have suppressed this disaggregation into individual years by sum- 
marizing the returns to the whole chain of holders of each bond. 
Second,  we offer little view of the variance of returns. The perceived variance 
across possible outcome states exists, of course, only in the ex ante eyes of 
the potential investor, and is only indirectly revealed in ex ante returns like 
those in  table 2.2. Yet  other studies have shown an interest  in  commenting 
indirectly on the unobservable perceived variance by measuring ex post vari- 
ation in returns (I) across debtors, (2) across creditors, (3) across the lifetimes 
of a cross-section of individual securities, (4)  across individual holding years 
for a cross-section  of securities,  and (5) across the years of  existence of a 
single security. Of these, our table 2.3 sheds only a little light on the first. With 
additional work, our data set could yield variances (2) and (3). For studies of 
variance (4),  see Fishlow (1987) and again Edelstein (1977 and 1982). 
8. The sudden reference to abstract social welfare, so soon after a discussion 
of real-world debtor governments, may surprise. Yet the charitable assumption 
that governments maximize some social-welfare analogue to individual utility 
suits the present debating purpose. If  officials’  goals are narrower and less 
worthy of  the “social”  label, then the present paper’s warnings about rescue 
operations will be reinforced. 
Another element of realism that is missing at this point is soon to be intro- 
duced: The borrower often has an incentive for only partial, rather than com- 
plete, debt repudiation. 
Our definition  of  a debt crisis is  narrower than our definition of  debtor 
sovereignty: 
1951, 629-31). 
a debt crisis exists 
the debtor is sovereign <=> (1  + r)D >  P. 
<=> (1 + r)D > P +  B <=> VD  > VR; 
9. We should deal with two other ways in which one might suspect that extra 
lending could somehow raise P and B  faster than D, making debt more en- 
forceable and allowing a reduction in the interest rate. First, one might suspect 
that a better collateral mechanism could be devised, e.g., developing stronger 
trade dependence, raising P  more than D. But if  so, then why was this option 
not already taken? Second, one might imagine that a third party, such as the 
IMF, could raise B more than D  by offering new loans at so low an interest 
rate that the borrower’s surplus from continued faithful repayment, B,  is raised 
more than D is raised, But this proposal, discussed below, can only raise B by 
writing down debt service. It is a form of partial default. 102  Peter H. LindertIPeter J. Morton 
10. Domar (1950). Domar’s reasoning  was repeated recently  by  Niehans 
(1985).  This reasoning has been  criticised for overlooking the default impli- 
cations of its treatment of the infinite horizon (Lindert 1971, 1976). See also 
the 1928 quotation from Auld in  Felix  (1987, 20). Note that this frequent ar- 
gument would have been correct if  it had been confined to the case in which 
D  remained  below  the  enforceable  limit  on  prudent  lending,  the  limit 
h  = (P + @/(I  + r). 
I 1. A model that might  seem to contradict the present result in the context 
of sovereign debt is that of  Krugman (1985), which explicitly argues (on pp. 
88-89)  that defensive relending is rational for creditors. But Krugman’s formal 
model  (pp.  84-88)  implies  the opposite, i.e.,  that extra lending raises  the 
(second-period)  incentive to default. The alleged case for defensive relending 
is not based on his formal model, and makes some questionable assumptions: 
(a) that postponing default somehow prevents it; (b) that a small fresh loan 
would entice borrowers to repay debt service exceeding the fresh loan; and 
(c) that offering submarket interest rates to a problem borrower is a way of 
avoiding default (in fact, it is a way of acquiescing in partial default). 
12. The issue is noted in  Sachs (1984,  29-37)  and Eaton, Gersovitz, and 
Stiglitz (1986, 496-98). 
13.  Panic could ruin the collective ability of already exposed creditors to 
hide the likelihood of default from new lenders, who might  somehow have 
been induced to take over their exposure. Such a successful deception would 
not, however, have raised the wealth of all creditors. 
14. The B term is included in column (3) under the simplifying assumption 
that successful negotiation of partial debt reduction restores the credit ration 
that the borrower would have had with full repayment. The assumption seems 
reasonable. While the debtor’s record is tainted, lowering debt from (1  + r)D 
to (1  + X)D can convince creditors that the rewards from further default have 
been  lowered  enough to  warrant  safe  relending  up to the prudence  limit 
h  = (P + B)/(l + r). 
15. There were also pure unilateral  refinancings permitted  by contract, in 
which the debtor took advantage of a dip in market yields to retire old high- 
interest debt. 
16. For further background, see Peters (1934), Ferns (1960), Ford (1962), and 
Fishlow (1985). 
17. And, apparently, the taxpayers take a capital loss equal to (e - r)D < 0. 
One might argue that the lower interest rate is not below market, and thus not 
a loss, given that repayment is more certain than on the other debt in  the 
marketplace. This argument would presumably  rest on the perception  that a 
debtor always tries to remain faithful to the IMF, the “lender of first resort.” 
Yet the same would hold for loans to other debtors not on the brink of default, 
suggesting that the rescue does indeed  impose  a  risk-adjusted  loss  on the 
taxpayers relative to their other (via-IMF) lending opportunities. 
18. Here we echo a theme sounded by Vaubel (1983), among others, though 
with more emphasis on the international private lending hazards and less on 
macro-policy hazards. 
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